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INTRODUCTION

There is tremendous debate over how the judicial system
should handle information and materials the government would
prefer to keep secret.
Courts, scholars, and policymakers
struggle with the relevant procedures and incentives, many of
which are complex or contradictory; secret information is handled
in a variety of different ways, depending on precise
circumstances. The post-9/11 era has amplified the issues
regarding protected information and the judicial system; as the
United States government shifted its attention to national
security in a number of unprecedented ways, one effect has been
an explosion of secrecy claims in court, as well as a tremendous
proliferation
of litigation
involving
security
issues.
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Disputed topics include what kind of protected information
should be admissible, what standards and review processes
should govern those decisions, and who should be responsible for
Courts have expressed
the various aspects of these steps.'
frustration with legal structures and government decisions
regarding protected information; 2 academic commentary has
pronounced security-related processes broken and suggested
various possible solutions in both civil and criminal contexts;3
and both houses of Congress recently have considered legislation
aimed at substantially altering how courts would approach and
manage classified material.4
These questions are essential, of course, and some amount of
reform-or standardization and clarity, at the very least-would
greatly improve the situation for courts and litigants alike.
While such reform would be beneficial, however, rather than
resolving judicial uncertainty, any structural process-including
the extant one-prompts a number of vital and unresolved
' See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1302-06 (2007); Amanda Frost, Essay, The
State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007);
Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007).
2 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1094 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("It is far better to require the government
to make its claims of state secrets with regard to specific items of evidence or groups
of such items as their use is sought in the lawsuit."), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442
(2011); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[Wlhile the
Government has provided some information about the source's credibility and
reliability, it has not provided ... enough information to adequately evaluate the
credibility and reliability of this source's information."); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d
834, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Lewis Carroll notwithstanding, the fact that the
government has 'said it thrice' does not make an allegation true.").
I See, e.g., Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and
the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 348, 370-71 (1998) (discussing
problems with discovery processes when intelligence and law enforcement activities
overlap); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 168-76 (2006) (arguing that
courts can and should review government assertions of secrecy); David E. Pozen,
Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act,
115 YALE L.J. 628, 632 (2005) (advocating increased judicial scrutiny of government
protection of classified materials).
* State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008), was first proposed in
the Senate during the 110th Congress, on January 22, 2008; similar legislation was
introduced in the House, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2008), on March 13, 2008. The bill
was reintroduced in the 111th Congress in both houses, as S. 417, 111th Cong.
(2009) and H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009), on February 11, 2009. None of these bills
received floor votes.

1278

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

IVol.

85:1275

questions. Perhaps most importantly, if and when classified
materials are introduced into the legal system, courts need to
know how they should treat the information itself.
Knowing how to view, evaluate, and understand intelligence
products is neither intuitive nor widely understood in the legal
community. There is therefore a pressing need for a blueprint,
the beginnings of which this Article will attempt to provide. This
Article examines the current landscape of courts and their
treatment of protected material, critically addressing the
shortcomings and inconsistencies of judicial attempts to grapple
with government secrets. It proposes a more rigorous and
consistent juridical approach to these issues, and it argues that
the existing treatment of classified material is substantially
lacking but readily improvable.
Part I of this Article briefly examines the existing legal and
conceptual frameworks that purport to manage protected
information in the judicial system. It compares and contrasts the
civil and criminal approaches, and it notes challenges to the
existing processes and proposed changes from policymakers and
scholars. Part I also discusses the questions and problems raised
by potential changes-and even by the status quo. Part II
explores secret information: its creation by individuals and
agencies; its synthesis into "finished" intelligence; its various
uses; and the challenges it poses for the legal process.
Part III offers three proposals for how courts should
treat secret information to avoid or counteract the problems
discussed and to maximize the interests of justice in criminal,
civil, and nontraditional contexts. It argues that critical judicial
responsibilities include: (1) reviewing information designated as
secret, (2) applying appropriate skepticism to secret information
and government claims, and (3) examining source material. Part
III then reviews selected decisions in which courts have made
judgments about protected information, and it discusses and
evaluates these approaches.
I.

FRAMEWORKS FOR PROTECTED INFORMATION: CURRENT
STRUCTURES AND CHALLENGES

To adequately address how courts should treat protected
information, it is necessary to first briefly consider the existing
legal and conceptual structures that shape the roles of classified
and other secret information in the judicial system. Additionally,
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it is useful to note and analyze challenges to the current
processes, as well as pending legislation and cases that could
produce transformation.
Legal and ConceptualFrameworksfor Classified Information

A.

Protected Information in Criminal Law
"Protected" information generally is addressed in markedly
different ways, depending on the legal context. In criminal law,
use of secret information is governed by the Classified
Information Procedures Act ("CIPA"), which provides guidelines
for the government and defendants alike to balance the
government's interest in secrecy against the various rights of the
accused and the public in the justice system.'
Passed by Congress in 1980, CIPA codified a pragmatic
approach to the rights and incentives involved in using classified
information in criminal cases. The principal goal of the statute
was to protect the government against "graymail," where a
defendant threatens to reveal classified information at trial to
Additionally, CIPA helps regulate
deter prosecution.6
government use of classified information, requiring that such
materials be made available to defendants and their attorneys as
well as mandating cooperation with the court to fulfill a number
of requirements.'
CIPA attempts to address three common scenarios: the
government's need to use classified evidence to prosecute; a
defendant's need to introduce classified information-of which
she is already aware-for exculpation; and the respective
obligations of both sides in discovery.' A defendant does not
want to be surprised by classified information (and indeed may
1.

Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006).
United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("CIPA serves
[the security of the nation] ... by helping to ensure that those with significant
access to such information will not escape the sanctions of the law applicable to
others by use of the graymail route.") (citing S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 3 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296); Bill Summary & Status, 96th Congress
(1979-1980), S. 1482, CRS Summary, THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d096:SN1482:@@@D&summ2
=4& (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) ("Classified Information Procedures Act-Sets forth
pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classified
information ('graymail' cases.)").
18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 5-6.
* See id. §§ 4-6.
6
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have the right not to be under the 6th Amendment);' neither does
the government, because such disclosure could damage national
security. CIPA addresses this mutual interest in advance notice
of intended utilization of protected materials by placing disputes
over their use firmly in the pre-trial phase, allowing the
government to make its cost-benefit analysis early in the
process.10 Whether it is the government or a defendant intending
to introduce classified material, the government in both
instances must decide whether the benefits of prosecution
outweigh the potential costs of exposing the protected
information."
In the context of discovery, CIPA allows courts to authorize
the government to redact classified information from documents
provided to the defendant, substitute an unclassified summary,
or substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to prove.12 The government
may pursue these options ex parte and in camera.3 The statute
also requires advance disclosure by the defendant of any intent to
disclose classified information at trial, whether such materials
are already in her possession or are received through discovery.14
If a court determines that certain evidence must be included, the
government's refusal to do so, or unwillingness or inability to
provide an appropriate substitution, can lead to sanctions up to
and including dismissal of the indictment.'" CIPA does not
purport to change evidentiary standards,'6 nor does it allow
courts to question the validity or level of the classification, 7 but
those limitations are subordinate to the important and useful
' See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) ("[T1he evidence used to prove
the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue.").
10 See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a)-(b).
See id. § 4.
12 See id. § 6(b)-(c).
' See id. § 6(c)(2).
4 See id. § 5(a).
1 See id. § 6(e)(2).
1 See id. § 4 (noting that classified elements of materials discoverable under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may be redacted). But see United States v.
Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that "[CIPA's] application results
in a more strict rule of admissibility" than is normally the case under the usual
relevance standard).
17 See Smith, 750 F.2d at 1217 ("[T]he government .. . may determine what
information is classified A defendant cannot challenge this classification. A court
cannot question it.").
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unclassified
and/or
redaction
for targeted
provisions
substitution.1 8 As a matter of evidentiary process, CIPA is
reasonably effective, setting the government's desire to prosecute
against its inclination toward secrecy in matters of national
security.
The statute does not, however, provide any guidance to
courts regarding the information itself. There is no instruction
about how to evaluate the classified materials, how to determine
whether unclassified summaries are adequate or accurate, or,
perhaps most importantly, how the fact-finder should assess the
contents, analysis, or conclusions of the protected information.
Protected Information in Civil Law
Classified material is managed quite differently in civil
cases, where the State Secrets Privilege ("SSP") is the relevant
governing principle. The SSP is an evidentiary rule based on
English common law and established in modern American
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court decision in United States
When the government believes that court
v. Reynolds.19
proceedings might disclose sensitive information that could
endanger national security, it may submit a formal claim of
privilege asking the court to prevent the admission or use of the
disputed materials.2 0
The use of the SSP is both more haphazard and more
expansive than CIPA procedures. Rather than prosecutors and
defendants identifying classified materials and working with
judges to find ways to use the information, or limiting the
prosecution accordingly if the government is unable or unwilling
to do so, the SSP is invoked by a "formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter."2 1 In Reynolds, for example, the SSP was invoked by the
Secretary of the Air Force.22 In addition to the huge number of
individuals who are "the head of the department" and who could
therefore assert the privilege, the SSP is further expanded by the
2.

18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c).
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8, 11 (1953). See generally EDWARD
C. LIu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40603, THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND OTHER
1s

19

LIMITS ON LITIGATION INVOLVING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (2009).
20 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8; LIU, supra note 19, at 2.
21 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at
7-8.
22 See id. at 4.
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apparent lack of restriction to classified information.2 3 Neither
the Supreme Court nor any lower court has provided a clear
definition of state secrets. Instead, courts rely on the nebulous,
Furthermore, while Reynolds
senescent Reynolds opinion. 24
established SSP applicability for military matters, subsequent
The
decisions have expanded the coverage considerably."
government has claimed the privilege, for example, in relation to
programs that have been publicly identified 26-not to mention
the invocations later revealed to be duplicitous, including in
Reynolds itself.2 7
Unlike with CIPA, where the United States has a strong
interest in working toward the admissibility of classified
information in some form-whether as part of its own case or to
avoid dismissal if the defendant possesses and wants to use such
materials-the incentives with the SSP are overwhelmingly in
favor of government recalcitrance. If the government is a party
at all-which it need not be to assert the privilege2 8-it is as a
defendant, and there is virtually no incentive to disclose; indeed,
when the information will be used against the government, there
is substantial motivation to keep the secrets (or so-called
"secrets") out of court.

22 See id. at 10 (speaking not of "classified" information being privileged, but,
rather, that which "in the interest of national security[ ] should not be divulged").
to satisfy the court, from all the
24 See id. at 10 ("It may be possible
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate. . . ."); see also Adam Liptak, In Knotty State Secrets Case, Justices
Ponder Telling Litigants To 'Go Away,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at A15 ("It has
been almost 60 years since the Supreme Court last had a hard look at the state
secrets privilege . . .. The privilege was at the center of an argument at the court on
Tuesday. But the justices did not seem inclined to use the opportunity to give the
lower courts guidance about its contours.").
25 See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Possibly because
the state secrets doctrine pertains generally to national security concerns, the
privilege has been viewed as both expansive and malleable.").
" See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (discussing plaintffs claim that the circumstances surrounding one
plaintiffs rendition had "been publicly acknowledged by the Swedish government"),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296,
301 (4th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging plaintiffs claim that "CIA rendition
operations ... had been widely discussed in public forums").

27 See infra Part III.B.4.
28 See, e.g., Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1076 (where the United States intervened to
assert the privilege).
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This combination of the incentive to conceal with the lack of
judicial guidance or oversight has resulted in mounting
The criticisms are both
condemnation of SSP practices.
SSP assertions have grown
quantitative and qualitative.
substantially in number in recent years, and the frequency of the
government's use of the privilege is accelerating. Between 1953
and 1977, there were very few instances of SSP invocation, with
most accounts reporting single digit usage. Between 1977 and
2001, there were around fifty reported such instances. 29 The
Bush administration, in just eight years, reportedly asserted the
privilege "at least 39" or "dozens of' times.30 Because not all uses
of the SSP are reported, it is difficult to determine with certainty
the frequency of its invocation, but if the reported cases are any
guide, the increase in recent years is substantial.3 1
See

Gup, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 109 (2007) ("In the 19 years between 1954 and 1973, the
29

TED

U.S. government invoked the state secrets privilege only four times. In the five years
since 9/11, it has been invoked at least 23 times .... ); Frost, supra note 1, at 1938
("[Sltarting in 1977, the executive raised the privilege with greater frequency.
Between 1953 and 1976, there were only eleven reported cases addressing the
privilege; between 1977 and 2001 there were fifty-nine reported cases."); Fuchs,
supra note 3, at 134-35 ("In the 23-year span between the Supreme Court case that
authorized use of the state secrets privilege in 1953 and 1976, the government
litigated cases involving the privilege four times. In the 24 years between 1977 and
2001, courts were called to rule on the government's invocation of the privilege 51
times.").
3o See Nicholas Goldberg, Editorial, Backgrounder; 'State Secrets' Go on Trial,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at A33 ("There's a strong case to be made that the Bush
administration overused and misused the state secrets privilege. After 9/11, Bush
Justice Department officials invoked the privilege dozens of times-far more times a
year than any of their predecessors."); Dana Priest, Secrecy Privilege Invoked in
Fighting Ex-Detainee's Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 13, 2006, at A03 ("The state
secrets privilege was invoked about 55 times from 1954 to 2001, according to the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and in the first four years after the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, it was invoked 23 times."); David Kravets, New Attorney
General Orders Review of Bush-Era State Secrets, WIRED (Feb. 9, 2009,
3:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/02/ag-holder-deman ("The Bush
administration invoked the privilege at least 39 times, whereas all U.S. presidents
have invoked it roughly 55 times combined ... [including just] six times between
1953 and 1976 .. . ."); Marc A. Sorel, Rethink the State Secrets Privilege, BALT. SUN
(May 7, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-05-07/news/bs-ed-state-secretsthe U.S.
("Since Sept. 11,
20100507_1_privilege-wiretapping-government
government has asserted the privilege in more than 100 cases.").
" See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 81
(2010) ("[Clurrent scholarship ... [omits] the many cases in which the court
sidesteps the question altogether or dispenses of the state secrets questions at an
early stage in the litigation ... [or in] unreported and unpublished opinions ... as
well as sealed memoranda and opinions."); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto,
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However, during that time there has been no corresponding
increase in clarity or consistency of the use or interpretation of
the SSP. The guidance for lower courts continues to be rooted in
the Reynolds decision, which established a two-step process to
use when the privilege is asserted.3 2 First, the head of the
department with control over the matter must formally invoke
the privilege." Second, and more substantively, the court "must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the
claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.""
The Reynolds opinion, even while acknowledging the "real
difficulty" of such a task, hedged on exactly how courts could or
should accomplish this goal." The Court said that "[iut may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the
case" that the privilege should apply-but, the Court indicated,
such a determination might not involve actually reviewing the
materials at issue. 6 The Court further elaborated: "[Tihe court
should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by
the judge alone, in chambers."37 The Reynolds decision also noted
that while control over evidence "cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers," the court would "not go so far as to
say that the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge" for the claim to be accepted.
In addition to being used with increasing frequency, the SSP
also has been used more expansively in recent years. The SSP
was initially formulated as a privilege to prevent the admission
of specific pieces of evidence, whereby the government could
assert the SSP during discovery.39 This would allow courts to
determine the necessity of the materials to the litigation, the
State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. Scl. Q. 85, 101 (2005) ("Because
reported cases only represent a fraction of the total cases in which the privilege is
invoked or implicated, it is unclear precisely how dramatically the use of the
privilege has grown. But the increase in reported cases is indicative of greater
willingness to assert the privilege than in the past.").
32 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
3 Id.
34 Id. at 8.
35

6
37
3
3

Id.
Id. at 10.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
See Chesney, supra note 1, at 1281.
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possibility of using available alternative information, and the
circumstances of the case as they applied to the legitimacy of
the invocation.4 0 Naturally, sometimes the successful use of the
privilege would result in dismissal during the discovery phase,
if the evidence excluded were central to the plaintiffs case."
Recently, however, the executive branch repeatedly has used the
SSP to prevent lawsuits from even reaching the discovery phase
by invoking the privilege even before answering plaintiffs'
complaints.4 2 Accordingly, the privilege becomes essentially a
pre-discovery motion to dismiss, even if the plaintiff might
otherwise be able to amass enough evidence to move past the
pleadings stage.4 3
The jurisprudence resulting from this precedential morass
has been widely-and increasingly-criticized."
Protected Information in Nontraditional Legal Settings
Since the attacks of September 11, the United States has
dramatically augmented its efforts against global terrorism,
including via engagement in two major wars, in Afghanistan
and Iraq, as well as through expanded law enforcement and
The legal
intelligence operations throughout the world.
between
somewhere
rests
counter-terrorism
for
framework
3.

See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8; LIU, supra note 19, at 2-3.
See, e.g., Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissing an action
against the FBI for alleged discriminatory termination after the court accepted the
FBI's proffered in camera explanation and determined that the reason for the
termination was deemed protected by the SSP); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 99097 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dismissing an action against the National Security Agency upon
finding that evidence of communications interception was privileged).
42 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299-300 (4th Cir.
2007).
3 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9; Lyons, supra note 1, at 117 ("The state
secrets privilege was not crafted in Reynolds to be a complete bar on the
adjudication of complaints by the courts; the government, however, is applying the
privilege in such a way that complaints are being completely dismissed, denying any
forum to plaintiffs for redress.").
" See, e.g., Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31, at 87-88 ("The incentives to abuse
40
4

the privilege are obvious .

. .

. As presently formulated, the privilege is ill-equipped

to balance between [the] two goals" of protecting "legitimate interests . . . while
trying to eliminate abuse of power. . . ."); supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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ambiguity and nonexistence, and the government, academics,
and litigants have all scrambled to find their respective footing
in an evolving area of the law.
Some aspects of that developing genre are orthogonal to this
discussion, such as the reach of the Constitution to foreign
individuals and countries, or separation of powers questions at
the highest levels of government. Other elements, such as the
admissibility of classified information in lawsuits brought by
plaintiffs alleging that they have been spied upon or subject to
abuse while in detention, or in the prosecution of alleged
terrorists in federal court, are related but generally encompassed
These latter
by traditional civil or criminal frameworks.
examples are governed by CIPA and the SSP, and although
government actions in recent years have presented new and
challenging issues, those structural approaches are relatively
familiar."
In some instances, however, neither CIPA nor the SSP
govern the review or use of protected materials.4 6 In particular,
cases in recent years regarding detainees at military facilities
outside the United States have dominated legal debates and
headlines.4 7 Such proceedings have presented new and unusual
jurisprudential issues, including how courts should use and view
protected information. Accordingly, some of these cases are
excellent examples of how judges have struggled to address
classified information in its many forms.4 8 Because of the
structure of detainee trials and appeals, and the bifurcated legal
routes available-habeas corpus petitions as well as appeals on
the merits of military tribunal decisions-district and circuit
courts alike have encountered issues of intelligence and classified
These cases, and their
information in various contexts.
implications, will be further addressed in Parts III and IV; in this
initial exploration, it is simply important to note that courts are
4 See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300 (plaintiff claimed that he was illegally
detained and abused); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(plaintiffs claimed that they were illegally subject to electronic surveillance).
4 See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
47 See, e.g., Editorial, Another Rebuke on Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2008, at A22 (discussing the detention of Huzaifa Parhat at the United States Navy
Base in Guantanamo, Cuba); Peter Finn & Del Quentin Wilber, On Appeals,
Detainees Have Never Won, WASH. POST, July 6, 2011, at A01 (discussing the status
of Guantanamo Bay detainees' court battles).
4 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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confronted with protected material in some circumstances
wherein there is even less precedent and guidance than in
traditional criminal and civil processes.
4.

Current Criticisms, Challenges, and Proposed Reforms
In the context of criminal law, the competing government
incentives of prosecution versus concealment of information
help create a rough equilibrium of interests. This balance,
combined with the statutory codification of principles and
processes in CIPA, gives criminal law a structural framework
that is less vulnerable to confusion or abuse than other areas of
jurisprudence. Accordingly, criticisms of the judicial system's
dealings with protected information are often concentrated on
civil and nontraditional processes. Those criticisms are extensive
and varied, as are the proposed remedies; they are briefly
addressed here to provide context for the more specific discussion
of protected materials themselves-and to establish the dearth of
guidance regarding those materials' contents.
Two leading scholars of the SSP have called it "judicially
mishandled to the detriment of our constitutional system." 49 Its
problems derive mainly from the combination of two elements:
inadequate verification of government privilege claims by courts
and the lack of sufficient government incentives to reveal
protected information in civil proceedings. While the latter factor
results from entrenched structural influences, the former can be
addressed by courts under existing judicial powers and
responsibilities.
Regarding verification of government privilege claims, courts
have largely failed to act as a check against executive overreach
in asserting the SSP. Despite the Reynolds court's exhortation
that "jiudicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,"5o judges virtually
always allow the exercise of the privilege; while precise reported
numbers vary, out of dozens of SSP assertions by the
government, few if any have been denied." In most instances,
' Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31, at 86.
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
s' Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31, at 87, 102 ("The privilege seems to be ultraconstitutional, for the courts have not forced the government to disclose agency-held
classified information in any case in which the privilege has been asserted .... In
only four cases did courts ultimately reject the government's assertion of the
50 United
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courts grant the privilege without even looking at the evidence
With the caveat that
that is allegedly a state secret.
52
quantification of the SSP is elusive, a comprehensive study on
its use found that courts failed to review, even in camera, the
information in question in more than two-thirds of the instances
Observers have rightly criticized this
of privilege invocation.
extreme judicial deference to executive branch assertions of the
privilege; the problem is severe and is likely to continue.
In response, scholars and policymakers have proposed a
number of solutions. In Congress, a bill under consideration 54
would mandate judicial review of each specific item of evidence
against which the government has asserted the SSP, in order to
determine the legitimacy of the invocation. 5 If the privilege is
granted, a judge would then have to decide whether a nonprivileged substitute could be created, much like under CIPA.56
Courts would ostensibly be aided in this process by other features
of the bill, including, among other things, allowance of in camera
review, assistance of a special master, and ex parte hearings.57
Academics have also suggested a variety of possibilities, most
focused on judicial oversight," but also via administrative
remedies."

privilege. But even this number is misleading, for in two of those cases, the privilege
was obviously misused to protect unclassified information in the Department of
Commerce[;]" in a third, the rejection was procedural and ultimately reversed; in a
fourth, a complete trial was held in secret.).
52 See supra note 31.

53 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31, at 101 ("In less than one-third of reported
cases in which the privilege has been invoked have the courts required in camera
inspection of documents, and they have only required such inspection five times out
of the twenty-three reported cases since the presidency of George H.W. Bush.").
5 See supra note 4. The proposed Senate bill, S. 417, is used for purposes of this
analysis; it does not differ substantively from the 2008 Senate bill or their
companion House versions.
6 State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 110th Cong., § 4054(d)-(e) (2009).
56 Id. § 4054(e)-(f).
57 Id. § 4052.
58 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1 & 3.
6 An intriguing and persuasive case for an administrative approach to the
challenges and difficulties presented by the SSP is made by Beth George, who
argues that administrative law-based reforms will deter government abuse of the
state secrets privilege more effectively than judicial review alone. Beth George,
Note, An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1691 (2009).
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There also has been tremendous criticism of the
nontraditional legal systems established to process terrorism
suspects, particularly regarding detainees held in military or
intelligence facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Bagram,
Afghanistan; and so-called "black sites" throughout the world.
This opprobrium has not, however, principally addressed how
courts or tribunals have dealt with classified information,
perhaps because there have been much larger problems with
these processes; the use of protected information is a relatively
minor issue compared to, for example, the constitutionality of
entire structures. It is in nontraditional legal settings, however,
where courts paradoxically have the most freedom regarding
protected information, as there are virtually no statutory or
common law restrictions. As a result, some courts dealing with
detainee issues have provided rare examples of deft and
insightful management of classified information. Some of these
instances are discussed in depth in Part IV.
B.

The IncreasingImportance of Judicial Treatment of Protected
Information

Nearly all discussion of judicial processes involving protected
information involves issues of admissibility. Virtually none of
the relevant commentary or proposed legislation confronts the
critical matter of judicial treatment of the protected information
itself, independent of whether or not to allow it into a particular
case or proceeding."
In today's juridical environment,
addressing how courts should analyze and understand protected
materials is more important than ever, for three primary
reasons.

* Leila Nadya Sadat, A Presumption of Guilt: The Unlawful Enemy Combatant
and the U.S. War on Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 539, 541 (2009).
" Many of the existing and proposed methods for determining admissibility,
substitution, etc. include judicial examination of the underlying information. This
accentuates the importance of judges understanding how to understand and analyze
that information for the purpose of making procedural determinations, as will be
discussed thoroughly in Part III.
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1.

Post-9/11 Effects on Types of Cases
Most obviously, the United States' efforts against terrorism,
as well as our involvement in two major wars, have generated an
explosion of legal attention to-and court engagement withquestions of national security, many of which involve classified or
otherwise protected information.
American policy regarding detention of individuals suspected
of terrorism seems to receive the most scholarly and media
contemplation. It is not hard to discern why detainees have
captured so much attention: first, the constitutional relevance to
criminal procedure is firmly rooted in American legal tradition,
with courts accustomed to addressing habeas corpus petitions in
particular62 ; second, detainees are able to meet standing and
jurisdiction requirements in ways unavailable to prospective
litigants who have been, for example, unknowingly spied on or
hit by a Predator drone missile strike."
Less obvious but of similar importance are the changes
in governmental strategy and structure. The disintegration of
the "FISA wall," for example, has caused law enforcement
and intelligence entities to reconnect in unprecedented ways,
mixing roles and responsibilities and creating novel problems
for the use of protected material in criminal processes.6 4
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), enacted by
Habeas rights are constitutionally guaranteed, and while an examination of
the history of habeas corpus in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article,
it suffices to say that courts are very well acquainted with challenges to the
legitimacy of detention. While the legal particulars of detainee appeals based on the
Suspension Clause differ from, for example, an inmate appealing his death sentence
in New York State, the processes and structures for habeas claims have been firmly
established. Individuals held pursuant to the "global war on terror" therefore have a
relatively straightforward path to dispute the legitimacy of their imprisonment, and
judges have an established framework for handling these challenges. While the
paths of these habeas cases have at times been prolonged and circuitous, courts have
not shied away from grappling with the issues in thoughtful and assertive ways.
6 But see Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2007). Al-Haramain is the exception that proves this rule: The government
accidentally revealed to the Al-Haramain Foundation that it was spied upon; even
still, the foundation was prevented from using that information, despite its
disclosure, due to the successful invocation of the State Secrets Privilege. Id.
* David Kris, who served as the United States Assistant Attorney General for
National Security from 2009-2011, and was previously the Associate Deputy
Attorney General for national security issues from 2000-2003, wrote an insightful
and comprehensive article on this topic in 2006. David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of
the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 487 (2006).
62
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Congress in 1978, generated a "conceptual dichotomy between
law enforcement methods and all other lawful methods of
protecting national security.""5 This separation of intelligence
and law enforcement, supported by the legislative and judicial
branches for decades, remained durable even after 9/11-until
2002, when the Department of Justice convened the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR") for the first
time since it was established in 1978.66 The FISCR ruled that
the FISA wall's legal basis was faulty, a decision that allowed for
far greater coordination between intelligence and law
enforcement agencies than was previously allowed.6 7
More generally, there is tremendous pressure for all agencies
and departments with national security responsibilities-entities
that fulfill roles as disparate as spying on the streets of Tehran
and patrolling neighborhoods in Brooklyn-to collaborate in
counter-terrorism efforts. The threat of terrorism has caused a
major realignment of law enforcement priorities, 6 8 as well as a
marked shift in the extent to which collaboration between
government entities that follow different constitutional and
statutory rules is accepted,6 9 creating the potential for extensive
overlap.
The resulting blurring of the line between foreign
intelligence (whose primary purpose is gathering information)
and law enforcement (traditionally focused on apprehending and
convicting criminals) puts courts more squarely in the midst of
intelligence than ever before. Just a decade ago, judges rarely
had the occasion to evaluate intelligence methods, products, and
analysis; when they did, it was either under a rigorous statutory
scheme (CIPA) or in the context of a deferential but relatively
Today, there is greater
infrequento civil scheme (SSP).
interaction between criminal and intelligence bureaucracies and
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 488.
67 Id.
6 See, e.g., Department of Justice Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
6

6

Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the United
States) ("[T]he War on Terror is our Number One priority at Justice. . . ."), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfn?renderforprint=1&id=e655f9e
2809e5476862f735da118b546&wit id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735dall8b546-1-1.
69 See Kris, supra note 64, at 527.
70 In recent years, however, use of SSP in civil cases has increased. See supra
notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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dramatic augmentation of legal efforts against suspected
terrorists. There are also frequent challenges to the legal
foundations and processes resulting from these structural
changes.
Media and judicial focus on detainees
notwithstanding, these shifts are hardly limited to important but
still relatively unusual situations like Guantanamo Bay
incarcerations; in the nine years "[slince 9/11, the Department of
Justice has indicted 998 defendants in terrorism prosecutions."7 2
These kinds of cases, where intelligence and law enforcement
efforts are most likely to overlap, extend beyond high-profile
militants to include financing, embryonic planning, and a vast
array of "material support"7 3 crimes. 74 They are also investigated
in ways not limited by jurisdiction, either literal or figurative;
terrorist financing, for example, can be investigated concurrently
by intelligence and law enforcement agencies, both domestically
and abroad, with the dual goals of prosecution and information
gathering. Although these objectives are certainly not mutually
exclusive, nor are they always compatible-especially when the
government commences prosecution.
These types of terrorism prosecutions are frequent, broadbased, and here to stay. 75 Following a drop in the number of
indictments after the initial post-9/11 reaction, terrorism cases
See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT
CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2010, at 4 (Karen J. Greenberg
ed., 2010), available at http://www.1awandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/01
TTRC201OFinall.pdf (footnote omitted).
* It is a crime for any person to knowingly provide "material support or
resources" to any foreign organization that has been designated by the Secretary of
State as a "foreign terrorist organization." See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2011).
"Material support or resources," for purposes of Section 2339B is defined as "any
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation,
except medicine or religious materials [.]" 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2011).
14 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2010,
supra note 72, at 12.
71 While NYU's Center on Law and Security published a 2010 edition of its
annual "Terrorist Trial Report Card," id. at 1, the most recent comprehensive
analysis is contained in the 2009 edition. CTR. ON LAw & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF
LAw, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, at
iv (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2010), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/
Portals/0/documents/02_TTRCFinalJan142.pdf [hereinafter REPORT CARD].
7

72
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have shown no signs of abating." Such cases also are not limited
in ways one might imagine: of the 804 individual terrorismrelated defendants from 2001 to 2009 whose citizenship was
identifiable, by far the most common citizenship was American."
Additionally, although fewer than half of the defendants had an
identifiable alleged affiliation with a terrorist group, of those, the
most common was not with a Jihadist faction, but rather with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, or FARC, a group
of Marxist insurgents."
The potential for judicial exposure to intelligence practices
and materials is substantial and growing. Given the nature of
the fight against terrorist activities, and the dim prospect for
a traditional victory or truce, it is also likely to continue
indefinitely. Due to the increased number and variety of cases
dealing with classified and otherwise protected information, the
need for judicial understanding of the processes and products of
the intelligence community is critical.
The Impact of Increased Government Secrecy
The massive recent increase in government secrecy is
another critical reason why it is vital to consider judicial
treatment of protected information. The importance of secrecy in
many areas of national security policy and action is intuitively
obvious, and much of the information claimed by the government
as protected is classified. This secrecy can be manifested in
virtually every stage of the production of classified material. In
many instances, the sources of information are secret, the
identities and motivations of the people gathering information
are secret, the identities and motivations of those who analyze
the collected information are secret, the policy decisions made
based upon that analysis are secret, and actions resulting from
those policies are secret. As a consequence of so much opacity, it
is difficult for attorneys, judges, and juries to evaluate classified
information.
2.

76 See REPORT CARD,
1
78

Id. at 20.
Id. at iii.

supra note 75, at 3.
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Government secrecy is nothing new, as events such as the
Moynihan Commission and the Pentagon Papers demonstrate,
but in recent years, government secrecy has exploded. According
to Ted Gup's Nation of Secrets, between 1997 and 2007,
classification decisions more than doubled, and the government's
figures indicate that in 2005 the United States established
classifications an astonishing 14.2 million times.80 As he notes,
"That's 39,000 a day, or 1,600 every hour of the night and day.
Four out of five of those documents were classified 'Secret' or 'Top
Secret.' By definition, their disclosure threatens the security of
the nation."8 '
In addition to the dramatic increase in the number of
documents marked as classified, especially since 9/11, these
materials are often grossly over-classified. Gup provides a
particularly entertaining example in the context of explaining
the excessive government focus on secrecy: "When it comes to
secrecy and history, every historian has his own list of ludicrous
cases. The James Madison Project's list is as good as any: on it is
a Pentagon report classified 'top secret' that criticizes the
Like
excessive use of classification in the military .... "82
as
not
new;
issue
is
this
broadly,
more
secrecy
government
far back as 1956, a Defense Department report warned,
The
"overclassification has reached serious proportions."8 3
problem has continued, however, and as the number of
classification designations has increased dramatically in
recent years, so too has the problem of overclassification.8 4 In
2007, Mark Agrast, who has since been appointed Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in charge of national security
issues, testified about this topic before the House Homeland
7 Justice Potter Stewart's concurring opinion in the Pentagon Papers case was
scathing on this point: "[When everything is classified, then nothing is classified,
and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to
be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion." N.Y. Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).

s GuP, supra note 29, at 8.
81

Id.

Id. at 111.
83 COMM. ON CLASSIFIED INFO., REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BY THE
COMMITTEE ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 6 (1956), available at http://
8

bkofsecrets.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/coolidge-committee.pdf
* Steven Aftergood, Policy Essay, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What
Works, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 399, 401 (2009) ("In recent years, in fact,
classification-specifically overclassification-has increased, not diminished.").
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Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment."5 He condemned what he called an
"epidemic of over-classification" stemming in part from "rules
that resolve all doubts in favor of non-disclosure."86 According to
his testimony before Congress, there were nearly three times as
many classification actions in 2004 as in the last year of the
Clinton presidency.
In 2006, following the release of heavily redacted Senate
reports on the Iraq war, Senator Ron Wyden called the edits "a
textbook case of abuse of the classification system," further
elaborating, "[ulnfortunately, this sort of intelligence abuse has
gone on for years."8 Senator Carl Levin said that the classified
portions contained "deeply disturbing information" and "cover[ed]
up certain highly offensive activities ... the public is entitled to
the full picture."8 This sentiment is not limited to politicians or
to political progressives, either. In 1989, Erwin Griswold, former
Solicitor General under President Nixon, wrote, "It quickly
becomes apparent to any person who has considerable experience
with classified material that there is massive overclassification
and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with
national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment
of one sort or another."90 And in my personal experience,
16 Over-Classification and Pseudo-Classification: Making
DHS the Gold
Standard for Designating Classified and Sensitive Information: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Mark D. Agrast, Senior
Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2007/06/pdflAgrastTestimony_0628.pdf.
86 Id.at 2-3; Over-Classified and Pseudo-Classified:Testimony of Mark Agrast,
CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/06/
overclassified.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
87 Over-Classification and Pseudo-Classification: Making DHS the Gold
Standard for DesignatingClassified and Sensitive Information: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (testimony of Mark D. Agrast,
Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress).
8
Press Release, Office of Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden: Intelligence Reports
Overclassified, Public Should Have Access to More (Dec. 6, 2006), available at
http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/id=d5875b96-6aba-48c5-9bd67e13e7760a30.
89 Press Release, Office of Senator Carl Levin, Senate Floor Statement on the
Senate Intelligence Committee's Phase II Report (Sept. 8, 2006), available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroomL/release.cfm?id=262690.
90 Erwin N. Griswold, Editorial, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and
ClassifiedInformation, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
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while an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), I
was sometimes told by superiors to increase the level of
classification on my reports for reasons completely unrelated to
the informational content. As someone with the kind of
"considerable experience with classified material"" that Griswold
mentions, I wholly agree with his sentiments, and the post-9/11
governmental reaction has likely made this problem worse than
ever before.
This is not to say that no information, debate, or decisions
should be confidential, of course. But the huge growth in volume
of secret materials, the classifications of which are too often of
dubious legitimacy or origin, has profound implications for the
responsibility of courts to understand the content of intelligence
materials. This is especially true given the increasingly blurred
line between law enforcement and intelligence roles and actions,
as well as the expansion of international investigations in law
enforcement efforts. Many observers have suggested ways
to stem the tide of overclassification, perhaps most notably
Steven Aftergood, who has made a number of trenchant
suggestions; those avenues should be evaluated and pursued
where appropriate.9 2 Meanwhile, in the absence of effective
reform-or even in conjunction with it-there will be tremendous
amounts of classified information in government, much of which
could end up involved in legal processes. The large number of
terrorism-related prosecutions, massive increase in government
classifications, and conflation of policing and spying all strongly
indicate that courts will continue to encounter protected
materials. Judges must therefore be prepared to engage with
them in a sophisticated manner.
3.

Advocacy for Greater Judicial Responsibility
Judicial attitudes regarding protected information have
been, with limited exceptions, tremendously deferential to the
Executive branch. Beginning with the Reynolds case, where the
Supreme Court declined to even look at the allegedly secret
evidence upon which it would base its sweeping and influential
ruling, and continuing in the decades after that ruling, courts
have mostly avoided significant engagement with secret
91 Id.

See, e.g., Aftergood, supra note 84, at 411.
" United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953).

92
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materials.9 4 Judges generally have been content to accept
government claims, perhaps influenced by inexperience in the
workings of this kind of information and the lack of guidance or
support by Reynolds and its progeny for delving into the details
of protected information." Cases involving CIPA can be an
exception to this rule, generally because the government has
an incentive to admit classified materials-or acceptable
substitutes-in order to continue with prosecutions. But even in
CIPA, there is broad deference to government claims of secrecy,
and, importantly, the statute contains no standards for a court to
apply to evaluate whether an assertion of the privilege is actually
valid."
This persistent acquiescence, however, now faces growing
challenges from Congress, academics, and even courts
themselves in rare but important instances. Law journals are
replete with criticisms of the SSP and the increased use of
classified information more generally, and scholars have
suggested a number of ways to reform the process of admitting
protected material into evidence. These writers propose a variety
of changes, such as codification of a more structured, CIPA-like
process for SSP; administrative approaches to evidence
evaluation; and greater use of courts' existing ability to review
protected materials in a wide range of contexts."
Additionally, while some observers expected policies in this
area of the law to shift under President Obama, the continuation
of many national security and secrecy policies from the previous
administration makes it likely that the scholarly chorus for
change will continue-and perhaps intensify. Lay observers
have voiced concerns similar to those of legal scholars, even in
the wake of Executive branch reforms, which the New York
94See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31 ("Even though Reynolds held that
'judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers,' the practical effect of the decision is to cause precisely that
result."); see also supra notes 42 & 44 and accompanying text.
9 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31, at 101-02.
* LIU, supra note 19, at 7.
* See, e.g., J. Steven Gardner, Comment, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in
Civil Litigation: A Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567,
601-09 (1994) (advocating compensation schemes in connection with state secrets
invocation); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary
Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 527 (2007)
(arguing for judicial solutions regarding the privilege); George, supra note 59, at
1716-23 (suggesting administrative options).
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Times criticized as "hardly a total fix."" Rather than alleviating
concerns about government abuse of these processes, the actions
of the Obama administration have reinforced them. 99
Congress has joined the reform effort as well; bills
introduced in both the House and the Senate in the most recent
two full sessions of Congress would provide some direction and
transparency in the use of the SSP.'"
According to the
Congressional Research Service ("CRS"), this legislation would
codify the SSP, which, despite decades of recognition and use,
remains unaddressed by Congress.'" The laws would ostensibly
limit the use of the privilege to evidence the government could
demonstrate would cause "significant" harm to national security
if revealed, a standard that appears higher than what is now
required by Reynolds and related cases. 1 02 It is therefore possible
that the bills would require both greater government proof and a
higher actual level of harm to be demonstrated before the
privilege would apply. 1o
Also, because a large amount of
classified information might not cause "significant" harm to
national security if revealed,104 some classified material might
not be protected.105

9

See Editorial, An Incomplete State Secrets Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at

A38.
" See id.; John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2009, at A12 (noting surprise and displeasure from some observers when
President Obama declined to alter the approach to the SSP, upon taking office, in a
pending case).
100 See supra notes 4, 55-57 and accompanying text.
101

See Liu, supra note 19, at 12.

102See id. ("Both bills would also require a showing of 'significant harm' before
the privilege may apply. In contrast, courts applying Reynolds have generally not
required that the harm to national security be 'significant' in magnitude.").
103 Id.
104 For example, by definition, information classified as "[clonfidential," the
lowest level of classification, is that which "could be expected to cause damage to the
national security," a standard which might not meet the requirements of the
proposed legislation in certain circumstances. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed.
Reg. 19,825, § 1.3(a)(3) (Apr. 17, 1995), repealed by Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed.
Reg. 707, § 1.2(a)(3) (Dec. 29, 2009).
105 This is neither surprising nor necessarily problematic; classified information
that would not cause significant harm to national security arguably ought to yield to
the interests of justice and fairness in a court of law, if the information is vital to the
case and the government cannot show that it should be concealed for legitimate
security reasons.
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The proposed legislation mandates judicial review of the
information claimed to be privileged and requires the Attorney
General to notify Congress of any assertion of the SSP within
thirty days of the invocation. 10 6 The bills would further allow
federal courts to order the government to provide a redacted,
unclassified, or summary substitute of filings or motions to other
parties, and would give judges the power to determine which
evidence could be submitted and examined ex parte.0 7 The
proposed laws also formalize long-accepted elements of the
privilege, such as authorizing the United States to intervene in
any civil suit to protect information that may include state
secrets and requiring that the head of an agency formally assert
the privilege after actual consideration. 108 If the bills were
enacted in anything close to their forms as previously introduced,
judicial responsibility for evaluating and making determinations
about protected information would increase dramatically.' 0
Finally, some courts are beginning to assert themselves in
this area, due to practical or statutory influences or, in some
instances, obvious frustration with Executive overreach
regarding classified materials." 0 Some of these cases will be
examined in depth in Part III, but here it suffices to say that
court action itself-halting and infrequent as it may be-is
another indicator of the growing pressure for, and likelihood of,
an increased judicial role in managing the use of government
secrets in litigation.
All of these forces are working toward reform of legal
structures and practices regarding secret information. Success in
these efforts, from any of the current sources of advocacy, would
substantially alter the judicial environment when protected
information is at issue. Even under the current approaches and
structures, there is an increasing need for participants in the
legal system to have an understanding of government secrecy.
And implementation of any of the proposed changes could
drastically augment the interaction between courts and protected
information.
1
107
108

State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. § 4058(a)(1) (2009).
Id.

§

4052(a)-(b).

Id. § 4053.
1" These proposals, however, have languished; none of the four bills introduced,
two each in the Senate and House in consecutive congressional sessions, has reached
the floor for a vote. See supra note 4.
n0 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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The many forces arguing for change, in addition to the
increase in the use of protected information and the cases that
involve it, demonstrate that the treatment of government secrets
is a vital and growing part of our judicial system. In addition
to being one of the most important elements of modern
jurisprudence, however, it is also one of the least discussed and
understood. It is therefore critical for lawyers, judges, and legal
academics to better understand what "intelligence" is-how it is
cultivated and produced, how it should be understood, and, most
importantly, how it can be utilized. There are certain practices
and pathologies involved in protected information, particularly
classified intelligence products, that are new and unusual for
courts.
These elements of classified and secret materials,
including content and procedure alike, are neither selfexplanatory nor intuitively obvious. They must therefore be
explained and analyzed.
II. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE: WHO, WHAT, AND
How ... AND WHY IT MATTERS

Knowing how to view, evaluate, and understand classified
information is neither intuitive nor widely understood in the
legal community, and judges, clerks, lawyers, and litigants are
increasingly likely to encounter protected materials in important
legal situations. Accordingly, some guidance regarding the world
of intelligence may be useful. The following is an attempt to
provide a brief introduction, with particular attention to issues of
legal relevance.
A.

Classifications

The general rules governing classified information are
updated regularly through Executive Orders; as of this writing,
the most recent issuance of these rules was by President Obama
on December 29, 2009, via Executive Order 13,526.111 Those
with the authority to classify information may do so when,
among other things, its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably
be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to
national security." 2 In general, such information must pertain to
military particulars, intelligence activities, foreign government
nI Supra note 104.
112

Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707,

§§ 1.2, 1.4 (Dec. 29, 2009).

2011]

ADJUDICATING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

1301

information, technology and weapons of mass destruction, and
the like." 3 Information may not be designated as classified for
reasons including concealing violations of law or governmental
error; preventing embarrassment to a person, organization, or
agency; or restraining competition.11 4
Classified information is generally designated in one of three
categories: Confidential, the lowest classification level, includes
information that would "damage" national security if revealed; 15
Secret, the middle level classification, is information whose
disclosure would cause "serious damage" to national security;"'
and Top Secret ("TS"), the highest security designation category
that is publicly disclosed, covers information that would cause
"exceptionally grave damage" if divulged." 7 There are also some
restrictions on unclassified materials, including designations
that apply to court orders, ongoing investigations, and
information not subject to Freedom of Information Act
requests."s Access to classified material is granted generally on
a "need-to-know" basis; 1' that is, a person with a TS clearance
generally has access only to Top Secret materials that are
relevant to her work. These restrictions against information
disclosure are designed to protect, among other things, "sources"
or "methods" of intelligence collection, whether technological or

human.120
Additional
classifications,
including
"code
word"
designations, are subsets, or "compartments," of material
within these broader designations.
Code words are not
themselves designators of classification levels, but they can help
organize access to certain projects or subjects, or identify the
n13Id.

§ 1.4.

Id. § 1.7(a).
n1 Id. § 1.2(a)(3).
116 Id. § 1.2(a)(2).
117 Id. § 1.2(a)(1).
114

118 These restricted unclassified designations include, but are not limited to, For
Official Use Only ("FOUO"), Sensitive But Unclassified ("SBU"), and Law
Enforcement Sensitive ("LES"). On May 7, 2008, President Bush issued a directive
to consolidate some classification categories, including the three listed here, into a
single designation: Controlled Unclassified Information ("CUI"). Memorandum on
Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), 44 WEEKLY
Comp. PRES. Doc. 673 (May 12, 2008) (establishing a new framework for "Controlled
Unclassified Information").
119 Exec. Order No. 13526 § 4.1(a), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 § 4.1(a).
120 Id. § 1.4.
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source of certain information; code words themselves are
sometimes classified. 12 1 In addition, the designations "Sensitive
Compartmented Information" ("SCI") and "Special Access
Program" ("SAP") are identifiers, not classification levels, though
additional screening processes can be required to access those
categories of information. For example, to become an intelligence
officer with DIA, I had to pass an initial security background
check for a Top Secret/Secure Compartmented Information
("TS/SCI") clearance level; once I had that clearance, additional
"code word" inclusions could be added as needed.
Classification authority can be either "original," where
information is designated classified for the first time, or
"derivative," where previously classified information is used
or incorporated in new materials.122 Original classification
authority is ostensibly very restricted, available only to the
President, Vice President, agency heads, and government
officials delegated this authority under limited circumstances.' 2 3
In reality, this prerogative is extensively transferred; the
sheer volume of new intelligence information requires frequent
delegation of original classification authority.
Derivative
classification is simply the product of existing classified
information being reproduced, used, or summarized in new or
additional work.124 A classified document as a whole is marked
at the highest classification of any of its contents; for example, if
a twenty-page report contains information from unclassified,
Secret, and Top Secret sources, its overall classification is Top
Secret.12 5
Most classified materials are subdivided by
designation, so each heading and paragraph, for example, may
have its own classification label. 26
121 See, e.g., Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, Dep't of the
Navy, OPNAV Instruction 5511.37D, 5(b) (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http//
www.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/opnavinst/5511 37d.pdf ("A code word is a single word
assigned a classified meaning by appropriate authority to ensure proper security
concerning intentions and to safeguard information pertaining to actual, real-world
military plans or operations classified as CONFIDENTIAL or higher once
activated.").
122Exec. Order No. 13,526 §§ 1.1, 2.1, 6.1(o), 6.1(ff), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 §§ 1.1, 2.1,
6.1(o), 6.1(ff) (Dec. 29, 2009).
123 Id. § 1.3(a)-4c).
124 Id. § 2.1(a),
125 Id. § 2.1(b)(3)(a)-(b).
126 See, e.g., INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, MARKING CLASSIFIED
NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION 4 (Oct. 2007) ("The first step in the marking process is to
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In theory, this is a highly controlled and regulated practice;
the laws and executive orders governing classified information
appear to severely limit the people who can create classifications
and the ways they can do so. In practice, however, it is relatively
easy for analysts and officials to assign classifications with little
rhyme or reason, other than making sure any derivative
classification is at least as high as the source material. In my
team at DIA, for example, it was not uncommon for analysts to
make decisions about classifications on original documents, and
we would often increase the designations beyond those of the
source material. It was widely understood that consumers-the
word used for those who would read the materials we createdwere likely to dismiss unclassified analysis, believing it
unimportant if it did not come from classified sources. So even
if a product was based on unclassified, or "open source,"
information, it was not unusual for analysts to label it Top
Secret to increase its perceived validity or importance, either by
our own volition or at the direction of superiors. This problem,
along with a number of others beyond my personal experience,
led to the extensive overclassification described above.12 7
B.

The Intelligence Community

The entities that produce and use secret information for
analysis and action fall almost exclusively under the purview of
the Executive branch. Congress has oversight authority through,
among other things, committees on intelligence and the armed
services, and the judiciary sometimes becomes involved with
intelligence policy and practices, but government secrets are
primarily created and used by Executive branch entities. There
are seventeen distinct agencies, departments, and elements that
collectively make up a group generally referred to as the
"intelligence community." That includes well-known components
such as the CIA and FBI, as well as lesser-known entities, many
of which are parts of the Department of Defense. 28 Although
identify the classification level of each portion. A portion is ordinarily defined as a
paragraph, but also includes charts, tables, pictures, and illustrations, as well as
subjects and titles."), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/training/markingbooklet.pdf.
127 See supra Part I.B.2.
128The complete list is as follows: Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), an
independent agency; Army Military Intelligence ("MI"), Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity ("MCIA"), Office of Naval Intelligence ("ONI"), Air Force Intelligence,
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these groups are governed by their home departments and
agencies, they are also overseen generally by the Director of
National Intelligence ("DNI"), a cabinet-level official who is
responsible for advising the President, managing intelligence
collection and analysis activities, and facilitating coordination
between the entities, many of which have historical bureaucratic
rivalries with one another. 2 9 Collectively, individuals in these
entities gather, create, and analyze classified materials.
Individual roles are broadly separated into two categories,
each having very different responsibiliteis: collectors of raw
intelligence and producers of "finished" intelligence. Collection
occurs in a variety of ways, and the government's intelligence
basic
sources:
lists
six
community
website
Signals Intelligence ("SIGINT"), the interception of signals
between people and/or machines; Imagery Intelligence
("IMINT"), the representation of objects reproduced electronically
or by optical means, such as via visual photography, radar
sensors, infrared sensors, or electro-optics; Measurement
and Signature Intelligence ("MASINT"), which focuses on
distinctive characteristics of specific targets, such as nuclear,
radio frequency, acoustic, or seismic identifications; Geospatial
Intelligence ("GEOINT"), involving imagery and mapping data of
the earth; Open-Source Intelligence ("OSINT"), from publicly

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency ("AFISRA"), National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency ("NGA"), National Reconnaissance Office ("NRO"), National
Security Agency ("NSA"), and Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA")-all of which are
elements of the Department of Defense; Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence ("OICI") in the Department of Energy; Coast Guard Intelligence
("CGI") and Office of Intelligence and Analysis ("I&A"), both in the Department of
Homeland Security; Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA"), both in the Department of Justice; Bureau of Intelligence
and Research ("INR"), of the Department of State; and Office of Intelligence
and Analysis ("INA") in the Department of the Treasury. Member Agencies: Our
Strength Lies in Who We Are, INTELLIGENCE.GOV, http://intelligence.gov/about-theintelligence-community/member-agencies/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) [hereinafter
IC Website].
129 The DNI position was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 ("IRTPA") and strengthened by Executive Order 13,470,
signed by President Bush on July 30, 2008. See Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg.
45,325 (July 30, 2008).
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available information; and, most famously, Human-Source
Intelligence ("HUMINT"), information derived from human
sources.13 0
Measured by budget and manpower, the overwhelming focus
of United States intelligence is on SIGINT. Although precise
employment and budget numbers for these entities are classified,
the NSA is widely reported to employ around 30,000 people,
making it by far the largest intelligence community member, and
NRO reportedly has the largest budget; these two agencies lead
HUMINT, despite
the way in technology-based spying."13
conjuring up images of James Bond or Jason Bourne, is often
collected by overt actors such as diplomats and military attaches.
A large amount of HUMINT is produced from "walk-in" sources,
individuals who make themselves available to American
personnel for ideological or financial reasons. 132
Still, despite being a relatively small part of United
States intelligence as measured by budget and manpower,
HUMINT is instrumental in the formation of predictive and,
especially, investigatory analysis. While satellite photos and
communication intercepts are critical for strategic purposes and
high-level spying, at the ground level, intelligence agencies tend
to get information about individuals the same way law
enforcement entities do: from people. And with relatively little
information about sources passing between collectors to analysts,
as well as no opportunity for anything like the cross-examination
right found in our criminal justice system, there is great
opportunity for sources to promulgate misinformation due to
error or self-interest.

http://intelligence.gov/about-theGathering, INTELLIGENCE.GOV,
10 Data
(last visited
intelligence-community/how-intelligence-works/data-gathering.html
Mar. 25, 2012).
131 See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE, YOUR GOVERNMENT FAILED You: BREAKING
THE CYCLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY DISASTERS 95 (2008) ("The National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), widely thought to be the most expensive of the
agencies, builds and runs satellites that collect intelligence from space."); Vernon
Loeb, Critics Questioning NSA Reading Habits; PoliticiansAsk if Agency Sweeps in
Private Data, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1999, at A03 ("[Tihe NSA... [has] well over
30,000 employees . . . .").
WALTZ, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN THE INTELLIGENCE
132 EDWARD
ENTERPRISE 37-38 (2003) ("HUMINT sources may be ... recruited or 'walk-in'

volunteers who act for a variety of ideological, financial, or personal motives.").
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The goals of the intelligence community are straightforward.
Most broadly, it aims to protect the national security of the
United States. That involves knowing about other countries and
non-state actors-what they are doing, planning, and thinking
about; where they are; and the extent of their capabilities. This
can have military, diplomatic, or political implications, and the
objective is to have the maximum amount of information about
others while revealing the minimum possible to external forces.
More specifically, intelligence is geared toward three
categories of analysis: retrospective, current, and predictive.
Retrospective analysis looks back at events of behaviors and
attempts to put them in context, explaining the relevant factors
This can include meta-analysis-looking at
and causes.
whether/how/why the United States did or did not predict the
analytical subject. Naturally, retrospective evaluation informs
contemporary and forward-looking judgments. Current analysis
covers a range of subjects and issues, including biographical
assessments, determining the location and force constructions of
foreign militaries, leadership and succession structures of
nations and non-state actors, and any number of other
contemporaneous subjects. Notably, it also includes investigative
efforts, such as attempting to determine whether a detainee is
an enemy combatant. Predictive intelligence looks ahead to
future events, attempting to foresee events and behaviors based
on current and retrospective evaluation.
1.

"Finished" Analysis
All of those types of assessments go from collection to
production and dissemination through a complex and often
lengthy process. The result is called "finished intelligence.""
The days of an analyst are spent sifting through classified
materials, delivered to various electronic accounts by way of
targeted searches and filters in report aggregators and product
repositories.
There is no shortage of available classified
information; analysts' attempts to convert the flood of
information into relevant, usable products are often compared

1' Analysis and Reporting, INTELLIGENCE.GOV, http://intelligence.gov/about-theintelligence-community/how-intelligence-works/analysis-reporting.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2011).
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to trying to drink from a fire hose. 34 Analysts sift through
information for hours every day, working on current intelligence
products (such as daily PowerPoint slides or quick-turnaround
reports) as well as long-term papers that can take weeks or
months to complete. As Richard Clarke, former chief counterterrorism advisor on the National Security Council, put it: "All of
that collection of intelligence (the signals, the pictures, the spies)
is designed to give the other side of the intelligence community
the raw material to do its job. The other side, which is far
smaller in terms of people and budget, is analysis." 3 5
The United States intelligence community website describes
the conversion of source materials into finished documentation
thusly: "This includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all
available data-which is often fragmented and even
contradictory-and distilling it into the final intelligence
products, which highlight information on topics of immediate
importance or make long-range assessments."'3 6 Analysts work
within their respective fields, integrating data "into a coherent
whole," providing context and personal evaluation into a
resultant finished product "that includes assessments of events
and judgments about the implications of the information for the
United States (U.S.)."137 Or, as Clarke more succinctly states:
"Analysis is meant to answer questions that decision makers
ask-or should ask.

. ..

That is what intelligence is all about:

answering important questions, often based on hard-to-get
information, and providing warnings to policy makers."3
The late General William Odom, former director of the
NSA and assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the United
States Army, lamented influences unrelated to the needs of
policymakers: "Structural problems afflict not only intelligence

134 See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Peering into the Future, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JulyAug. 1994, at 82, 91 (1994) ("They spend their days drinking from a fire hose of
information."); Spencer Ackerman, Is this Really an Intelligence Failure?Real Talk
on
Abdulmutallab,
WASH.
INDEP.
(Dec.
31,
2009,
9:09
AM),
http://washingtonindependent.com/72807/is-this-really-an-intelligence-failure-realtalk-on-abdulmutallab ("The intelligence community is drinking from a fire hose of

data

. . . .").

supra note 131, at 96.
Analysis and Reporting,supra note 133.

"' CLARKE,
136

137

Id.

13

CLARKE, supra note 131, at 96.
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collection but also intelligence analysis."139 These structural
difficulties, not surprisingly, sometimes produce unsound results.
When "Rick MacKenzie" (a pseudonym), a very high-level analyst
for DIA-and an attorney-retired in 2006 after thirty-eight
years of intelligence work, he sent an email to many of his
colleagues that discussed, in part, some of the challenges facing
the intelligence community: "Something remains fundamentally
wrong with analysis.... One must sense a crisis in analysis, in
the management of analysis, in the training of analysts and in
the intellectual curiosity of analysts .. .. As near as I have been

able to judge, the pathology affects all agencies."' 4 0
These problems and criticisms are noted not to
criticize intelligence agencies or their employees-who are
overwhelmingly hard-working and principled-but rather to
counter the notion that classified intelligence should be
accepted uncritically, or even that it should be granted special
accreditation due to its clandestine provenance. Indeed, the
unilateral aspects of intelligence analysis, which can be both
produced and exacerbated by persistent structural problems or
individual political/careerist motivations, make it vital that
courts thoroughly evaluate finished intelligence.
Clarke, though neither a lawyer nor focused on the role of
intelligence in courts, made this point implicitly but insightfully
in the context of discussing problems resulting from groupthink:
A bad detective decides who is guilty and then sets about to
prove it, unjustly accusing an innocent man. Yet in criminal
cases, the prosecution is legally required to provide the defense
with any exculpatory evidence it turns up. The cops have to
give the defense counsel anything they have that could prove
the accused to be innocent. Not so in bad intelligence
analysis.141

139

WILLIAM E. ODOM, FIXING INTELLIGENCE: FOR A MORE SECURE AMERICA 5

(2d ed. 2003). Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), was formerly the director of the National
Security Agency.
140 A. J.
ROSSMILLER, STILL BROKEN: A RECRUIT'S INSIDE ACCOUNT OF
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES, FROM BAGHDAD TO THE PENTAGON 176 (2008).
141CLARKE, supra note 131, at 130-31. Joseph F. Nye, former chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, makes a similar metaphorical point: "Why take the
risks [of estimative analysis]? Why not stick strictly to the facts? One reason is that
facts about crucial international issues are rarely conclusive. There is often enough
evidence to indict, rarely enough to convict." Nye, supra note 134, at 83.
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This is a critical point and a useful comparison when considering
both the weight and the probative effect of protected materials.
In criminal investigations, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard required for conviction drives the evidentiary process.
The government's incentive to convict is balanced by a number of
factors, including the professional duties of prosecutors to act in
the interests of justice-as well as to disclose exculpatory
evidencel 4 2-rather than just their "side" of the litigation. The
government is also constrained by the weighty constitutional
protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Civil law provides its own protections, most
notably in the general prohibition of punitive measures beyond
monetary penalties, as well as the extensive requirements of civil
discovery. In addition, parties in any civil or criminal proceeding
must craft a narrative from demonstrable evidence and provable
facts, giving judges or juries the responsibility of deciding
questions of fact.
Conversely, these kinds of protections-the right of
confrontation, discovery, Brady rules, specified burdens of proof,
etcetera-do not exist in the formation of intelligence. If the
protected material is raw intelligence, such as a satellite photo or
a transcript of an intercepted communication, this problem may
be mitigated. With "finished" intelligence, however, or even raw
HUMINT, sources are generally subsumed in the broader
analysis, precluding examination of the information's origins. A
court would be appalled if the proof offered against an average
criminal defendant consisted of a summary analysis of the
evidence by a detective, concluding that the suspect was guilty
based on physical and testimonial evidence that could not be
evaluated or challenged. And yet that is how many courts treat
intelligence reports under current laws and practices.14 3 In
intelligence, the analyst is the fact-finder, so when those
judgments enter the judicial system, they have circumvented the
usual checks and protections we normally value so highly.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
Wittes et al., The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantdnamo
Habeas Cases as Lawmaking 35-37, 40-41 (Brookings Governance Studies Paper,
2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/re/papers/2010/0122
guantanamowittes chesney/0122_guantanamo wittesschesney.pdf.
142

143 Benjamin
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Reliability and Credibility
In addition to the structural elements implicated by court
use of intelligence materials, there are also individualized factors
to consider. A draft piece of finished intelligence is only the
beginning of the analytical process, and innumerable people and
influences can shape the content of a product as it is finalized.
While specific methods vary by office, in my experience-and
that of many colleagues-the process of editing and approval for
publication was nebulous, convoluted, and, at times, intensely
political.' 44
For a written paper, an analyst would either address a
subject she felt was important based on incoming information, or
"traffic", or a supervisor would assign a subject. After being
researched and written, the paper would begin its march up the
chain of command. It would first go to an analyst's immediate
supervisor, her team chief, who would return it with edits and
comments to incorporate. A revised version would then go to the
immediate team members, usually three to five people, for
additional input. After those changes were incorporated, it
would go to a broader group, allowing another 20 to 25 people to
comment. Upon approval from that larger group, the product
would be sent to the senior analyst and deputy team chief of the
division, reflecting the dual track of management and analytical
leadership, and they would make edits. Through this stage of the
process, comments and suggestions were "optional," such that if
the author disagreed, she could argue against the changes.
Following those layers of editing, the paper would go to
division leadership, a senior manager and senior analyst. At that
level, disputing changes was theoretically possible but rarely
attempted, and the power asymmetry became substantial. After
the approval of those two leaders, the product would move to
office-level personnel-the entire Iraq section of the Agency,
including managers and analysts. Paradoxically, at this stage,
while everyone had input, any of the office-level senior analysts
("OSAs") could approve the product for publication. Analysts
therefore worked to ascertain the specific views and predilections
of each OSA, quickly becoming adept at assessing the likely
2.

144 The following description borrows from my book, ROSSMILLER, supra note
140, at 135-36.
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respective responses to an argument or position. We could then
game the system by making sure the product moved up the chain
of command when the desired OSA was on duty.
No matter which OSA reviewed the product, however, edits
could be bounced back and forth indefinitely between analyst and
OSA until the latter granted publication approval. As I later
described while writing about this system, "The process was
extensive and often convoluted. Much as with judges or baseball
umpires, people were ostensibly adhering to the same
personal
and
interpretations
their
but
conventions,
preconceptions could greatly affect both the pace and direction of
a product ... . Not surprisingly, this process continually broke
down."us
Many intelligence products are written without bias or
insidious external influences; some, however, are affected by
factors that threaten the reliability and credibility of the
analysis. In particular, when judgments are likely to be made
public or used for a specific purpose such as court proceedings,
rather than the more general (and infinitely more common) goal
of informing policymakers, problems can result. 146 There is less
room for manipulation-by analysts or managers at any stage of
the process-when addressing a question like, "What are the
primary current political goals of Country X?" than one such as,
"Is Detainee Y an enemy combatant?," simply because everyone
knows the "right" (that is, desired) answer in the latter

example. 147

Id. at 136. But see CLARKE, supra note 131, at 345 (discussing the potential
benefits of extensive review and editing processes).
146 See, e.g., John McCreary & Richard A. Posner, The Latest Intelligence
Crisis,
23 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SECURITY 371 (June 2008) (questioning the validity of
intelligence judgments that are likely to be made public).
147 See, e.g., Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at app. vi, Al Odah v.
United States, No. 06-1196, 2007 WL 4790792 (June 22, 2007) (declaration of
Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve, describing
events regarding Combat Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") procedures: "It was well
known by the officers in OARDEC that any time a CSRT panel determined that a
detainee was not properly classified as an enemy combatant, the panel members
would have to explain their finding to the OARDEC Deputy Director. There would
be intensive scrutiny of the finding by Rear Admiral McGarrah who would, in turn,
have to explain the finding to his superiors, including the Under Secretary of the
Navy.").
145
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In any analysis, there can be problems of cherry-picking
facts, omitting certain materials, failing to appropriately
scrutinize sources, or being provided erroneous information,
among other things. These problems and influences in analysis
are well-documented, and Clarke explained the potential
negative consequences when products are insufficiently rigorous
or transparent: "The rationale for decisions, dissents, and
alternatives, the weight given various considerations, the
accuracy of facts, the expertise brought to bear, excursions
considering unexpected results should all be transparent to
decision makers. Without such information, decision makers
must, by definition, make uninformed choices."l4 8 The fact that
Clarke recommends this approach as part of his suggestions for
intelligence reform strongly indicates that it is sometimes not
done this way. Similarly, when courts use protected materials
that fail to meet this bar, they too make uninformed choices.
Analysis can be affected by all kinds of influences-including
structural as well as personal factors-in ways that are generally
absent from the types of evidence usually presented in court.
Critically, analytical judgments about questions like "is this
detainee an enemy combatant?," or "did this suspect have ties to
terrorist groups?," are themselves conclusions made based on
accumulated evidence that often would not meet the standards of
reliability and credibility usually required in a court of law. For
policymaking, acting based on analysts' best estimates makes
sense and is necessary. But history is replete with examples of
intelligence getting it wrong, and for courts to grant extra
deference-and perhaps even extra probative value-to protected
materials effectively short-circuits principles of evidence and
burdens of proof that are otherwise considered sacrosanct.14 9
Reading and UnderstandingIntelligence Products
While it may seem superfluous to discuss the literal
composition of intelligence products, these kinds of materials are
often written in a mannered and idiosyncratic fashion. Not
understanding the particularities of language and structure in
C.

CLARKE, supra note 131, at 346.
See, e.g., 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE
§ 5:1-26 (7th ed. 2011); 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:54 (3d ed. 2011); 2 DAVID M. GREENWALD, ET AL.,
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 9:16 (3d ed. 2010).
148

149
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analysis can easily lead to misinterpretation, so it is worthwhile
to briefly address these elements of protected information.
Analytical judgments are estimates: the products of assembled
evidence that is often confusing, contradictory, or of questionable
origin. One of the most important elements of an analyst's job is
to separate good raw intelligence from bad raw intelligence-to
have a combination of knowledge and intuition that allows for
accurate and efficient processing of a vast stream of information.
Due to the nature of that information, much of which is often
ambiguous or uncertain, as well as the common problem of
missing pieces, conclusions are necessarily equivocal.
Major estimates are built on multiple component
evaluations, and as those informed guesses are stacked upon one
another, deductive foundations can become unsteady. As Clarke
has written, as long as products are transparent and properly
qualified, that is sufficient for the goals of intelligence analysis;
but for policy matters, decisions have to be made based on best
estimates, not certainties. 5 0
For courts, however, not only is this level of uncertainty
usually inadequate, but the language used to communicate
caveats can also be confusing or misleading. When the United
States releases unclassified versions of intelligence reports,
particularly "National Intelligence Estimates" ("NIEs"),'"' it
sometimes includes an "explanation of estimative language. "152
150 CLARKE, supra note 131, at 346; see also Nye, supra note 134, at 82-83 ("Like
all kinds of intelligence, estimative intelligence starts with the available facts, but
then it trespasses into the unknown and the unknowable-the regions where we
simply lack facts. . .. [Plolicymakers are under enormous pressure to make
decisions. In some cases they can wait for more information, but in others waiting is
itself a decision with irreversible consequences. . . . To help policymakers interpret
the available facts . .. to provide informed assessments of the range and likelihood of
possible outcomes-these are the roles of estimative intelligence.").
' Unclassified versions of NIEs generally contain the following descriptive
explanation: "National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence
Community's (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues
and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US
national security interests. NIEs usually provide information on the current state of
play but are primarily 'estimative'-that is, they make judgments about the likely
course of future events and identify the implications for US policy." NAT'L

INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE:

IRAN:

NUCLEAR

INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press
releases/20071203_release.pdf.
152 Id.; NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE:
PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ'S STABILITY: A CHALLENING ROAD AHEAD (2007), available

at http://www.dni.gov/pressreleases/20070202_release.pdf;

NAT'L INTELLIGENCE
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This statement is not attached to all classified documents, but it
offers an instructive commentary on language and analysis,
explaining:
We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate-

and probabilistic terms such as probably and likely-to convey
analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are
These assessments and
not facts, proof, or knowledge.
judgments generally are based on collected information, which
often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built
In all cases, assessments and
on previous judgments.
judgments are not intended to imply that we have "proof' that
shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items
or issues.' 53
The "explanation of estimative language" goes on to describe
the scope of probabilistic vocabulary, offering a spectrum
ranging from "remote" to "almost certainly" and accompanying
descriptive terms, as well as the definitions of confidence
levels, including "high," "moderate," and "low."'54 The terms
flanking "even chance" on the spectrum are "unlikely" and
"probably/likely," and these words, designating slightly more or
less than "even chance," are ubiquitous in analysis."' The terms
"might" and "may" are examples of even more ambiguous
judgments, reflecting "situations in which we are unable to
assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is
unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented," and these descriptors are
also deployed regularly.'5 6 Analysts might use these qualifiers to
protect themselves against reproach if they are wrong, or they
might use them because the source material is ambiguous, or
because the conclusions result from combining relatively reliable
judgments that become less certain when they are stacked upon
each other. Whatever the reason for these "weasel words,"

COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EsTIMATE: THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE

US HOMELAND (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press-releases/20070717
release.pdf.
153 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: IRAN:
at
available
(2007),
AND
CAPABILITIES
INTENTIONS
NUCLEAR

http://www.dni.gov/pressreleases/20071203_release.pdf.
154 Id.
155

Id.

156

Id.
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readers can only get a sense of reliability and credibility by
looking thoroughly and deeply at the bases for analytical
conclusions.
Notably, when intelligence is prepared specifically for
legal use, the qualifications normally inherent to intelligence
conclusions are sometimes expunged or omitted, giving an
inappropriate impression of certainty. In the 2002 Declaration
of Michael Mobbs regarding intelligence information about Jose
Padilla,1'5 approximately three pages of analytical conclusionsnot including a caveat-laden footnote about two confidential
sources-the words "likely/unlikely," "may," "could," "might," and
"probably" are used a combined zero times.'58 Similarly, the 2002
Declaration of Mobbs regarding Yaser Hamdi'69 contains zero
uses of any of those words.16 0 The declarations available to the
public are unclassified versions, but that may make the lack of
any reservation even more striking.
In multiple rulings on Padilla's case in federal court, thenDistrict Judge Michael Mukasey, who can hardly be accused of
having a political bias against the Bush administration, was
extraordinarily critical of the evidence presented. In an initial
opinion, in the context of examining the Government's claim that
Padilla should be prevented from communicating with counsel,
Mukasey's disapproval was concealed only slightly by mellifluous
phrasing: "the government's conjecture is," he wrote, "on the facts
presented to me in [the Mobbs Declarations], gossamer
speculation."1 6 ' Similarly, in a subsequent, related ruling,
Mukasey noted the speculative nature of the predictions of Vice
167 Padilla is a detainee originally categorized as an enemy combatant who was
ultimately convicted of terrorism-related crimes in federal court in 2007.
" Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Unclassified Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion adhered to on reconsideration sub nom.
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at
http://www.cnss.org/Mobbs%20Declaration.pdf.
159 Yaser Hamdi is a United States citizen who was detained as an enemy
combatant after being captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and released to Saudi Arabia
in 2004 on the condition that he relinquish his United States citizenship.
"I Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Unclassified Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527
(E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004),
availableat http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/hamdimobbs2.pdf.
161 Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
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Admiral Lowell Jacoby, then the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, regarding the potential impact of any
interruption in Padilla's interrogations: "the forecast speculates
not about an intelligence-related matter, in which Admiral
Jacoby is expert, but about a matter of human nature-Padilla's
in particular-in which, most respectfully, there are no true
experts."16 2
Courts must be vigilant and circumspect when they read
intelligence products. There is a unique language to this kind of
analysis, one that is neither intuitively obvious nor immediately
transparent. An assessment with an overabundance of qualifiers
and "weasel words" should be examined closely, with particular
attention to the source material; furthermore, intelligence
judgments with no indication of the analysts' confidence in
assessments-no "estimates of likelihood" at all-should be
viewed with considerable skepticism. The only thing more
worrisome than an intelligence judgment suffused with qualifiers
is one with none at all.
III. How COURTS SHOULD ASSESS PROTECTED
INFORMATION

Courts' attitudes toward and treatment of protected
information is a critical part of modern jurisprudence, including
in vital questions of constitutional law, the separation of powers,
and major criminal and civil proceedings. The vagaries and
challenges of intelligence analysis are myriad, and courts must
have an understanding and a model for dealing with them if they
are to successfully navigate the potential minefield of protected
information. The following examination aims to furnish the
beginnings of a framework for its judicial management.
A

Three StraightforwardSteps for Courts

Review the Information in Question
The most important step, and the easiest in terms of both
procedure and judicial expertise, is simply for courts to look at
the material the government claims is or should be protected.
Whether under existing CIPA and SSP structures, according to
new legislation, or by way of implemented academic proposals,
1.

162

Padilla,243 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
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courts should-and mostly already can-look at the materials in
question to evaluate government claims that the information
should not be admitted and/or shared with certain parties.
In criminal law, CIPA generally provides for this kind of
judicial appraisal. 1 63 As discussed in Part I, CIPA requires the
court to conduct a pretrial proceeding to assess the admissibility
of classified information." That proceeding may occur in camera
if the Attorney General certifies that a public hearing would
result in disclosure of the information, and the Government may
make an ex parte written submission to the court explaining the
national security sensitivity of the materials in question.16 5
Additionally, the Government may move to submit a substitute;
whether an unclassified summary or an admission of the
relevant facts the protected information would prove, either
There are a number of
option requires court approval.6 6
safeguards included to protect against public revelation of the
information, and several options are available for the
government to avoid exposing state secrets.
The critical element of CIPA review for the purposes of this
analysis, however, is that nothing in the statute prevents courts
from viewing and assessing the claimed protected materials;
indeed, the language of CIPA strongly suggests that courts
should and will do so. The provisions for in camera and ex parte
proceedings, as well as the requirement that courts conduct a
proceeding to determine the admissibility of the information,
suggest an active role for courts in evaluating intelligence.
In particular, courts are tasked with the responsibility of
determining whether a government statement admitting the
relevant facts proven by the disputed information or a summary
of the material is sufficient for use in prosecution; it is hard to
imagine how courts could do this without seeing-or at least
thoroughly understanding-the underlying information along
with the admission or summary. Additionally, CIPA authorizes
the Government to make an ex parte written submission to the

U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a)-(c) (2006).

168

Id. §§ 2, 5-6.
165 Id. § 6(c).
'"

166

Id.
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court explaining why the information at issue is of sensitive
national security value, further involving courts in the
assessment and evaluation of intelligence.16 7
In other areas of the law, there is neither a mandate for nor
a prohibition against courts examining claimed protected
material. Still, when confronted with the SSP, courts are
overwhelmingly deferential to government claims of secrecy
and privilege.1 68 The Reynolds decision is ambiguous on the issue
of judicial engagement with protected materials, warning that
"Uludicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated
to the caprice of executive officers," while in the very next
sentence adding a caveat: "Yet we will not go so far as to say that
the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the
judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case."169
Still, in more than fifty years of jurisprudence since Reynolds, no
court has been challenged for requiring judicial examination of
the information in question, and there is no other significant
Supreme Court guidance about what type of information, if any,
courts are prevented from viewing in civil proceedings.'
This lack of challenge against courts for viewing protected
materials is likely a result, however, of judges declining to
examine the information at all; courts review the documents
involved in state secret claims in fewer than one-third of the
instances of privilege invocation.171 There is simply no good
reason why judges should abdicate their responsibility to
evaluate SSP claims. The Reynolds court reasoned that judicial
review of such information, even in camera and ex parte, was
unnecessary and potentially dangerous when "from all the
circumstances of the case, [the court is satisfied] that there is a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged."' 7 2 In that instance, the court apparently
was satisfied by the totality of the circumstances, because it
failed to examine the information; had it done so, perhaps it
would have seen the dubious claim of privilege for what it was.' 3
Id. § 6(c)(2).
See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
16 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
10 See Liptak, supra note 24; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
1I Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 31.
172 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
11 See infra Part III.B.4.
117
'n
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It is hard to conceive how a judge-with appropriate
clearances and in a secure area-creates a security risk merely
by viewing classified information;17 4 conversely, it is easy to
imagine the potential for abuse when the government knows the
materials it seeks to protect likely will be seen by no one as long
as the privilege is asserted. This is also true, and perhaps even
more important, in nontraditional legal settings, such as the
processes for detainees alleged to be enemy combatants. Because
the intelligence analysis used as evidence against these detainees
has repeatedly proven deficient when examined, as discussed
below in Part III, it deserves careful review rather than apathy
or deference. Viewing the underlying information is a crucial
initial step to combat inefficiencies, lopsided incentives, and
abuse in the area of protected materials-and doing so is a step
already permitted by existing statutes and case law.
Apply Appropriate Skepticism
When courts examine protected information, they should
assess its reliability and credibility as they would any other
evidence, rather than granting additional credence or deference
based on its secret provenance. Not all intelligence is created
equal; there are ways to differentiate good analysis from bad and
to independently assess specific elements of protected materials.
The kind of language used in assessments will often help
telegraph the level of confidence in conclusions or predictions. As
discussed above, an excess of "weasel words" and qualifiers,
rather than clear, declarative statements, is evidence of
analytical uncertainty. The more conditional the language, the
more likely that the sources and/or conclusions are uncertain.
Policymakers and courts have different standards of proof for
taking action, and the intelligence process is geared decidedly
toward informing the former more so than the latter. This makes
sense, of course, but it means that protected materials should be
evaluated differently than other kinds of evidence. For example,
if an intelligence estimate indicates a seventy-five percent
2.

174 There are more than 850,000 Americans with Top Secret security clearances.
Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH.
POST, July 19, 2010, at Al. It seems doubtful that there is an insufficient number of
Senate-confirmed, Article III judges with credentials and trustworthiness to join this
club of nearly one million people in order to view protected materials when
necessary.
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likelihood that something is true, it is also saying that there
is a twenty-five percent chance that it is not true. A good
assessment will provide substantial evidence and reasoning for
both possibilities, allowing policymakers to decide how to use
that information in conjunction with the probability of the
conclusion being correct.
Unlike in many legal and courtroom scenarios, which tend
to have binary outcomes, the consequences resulting from
intelligence analysis are multivariable, making probabilities
useful in a qualitatively different way. For example, if the
intelligence community views it as a forty percent chance that
Terrorist Group X will acquire a nuclear weapon within a month
absent any intervention, policymakers may decide that the use of
force is the appropriate response given the potential dangers,
even though it is more likely than not that the group will not
obtain the weapon. Conversely, if some problematic but less
threatening possibility is pegged at an eighty percent likelihood,
it may not be useful to act even with much higher odds of
occurrence, depending on a host of factors.
Probabilities are evaluated differently in court because the
outcomes are usually binary and zero-sum. Intelligence analysts
are not generally required to think in terms of "beyond a
reasonable doubt," much less whether the evidentiary chain of
custody is reliable, what the burden of proof is, etcetera.
Additionally, regular consumers of intelligence recognize that the
"conclusion" of any particular product is really an estimate whose
likelihood is indicated-often in subtle or jargon-filled ways-in
the context of the broader analysis. Those conclusions are
often not unanimously agreed upon, and courts should also take
note of dissenting opinions in assessments. In inter-agency
reports, disagreements about the ultimate conclusion by specific
participants in the analysis-whether individual or agencylevel-are sometimes included as a footnote or in-text entry.
These differing views can help highlight fault lines, weaknesses,
or omissions in the overall assessments.
As noted above, when intelligence is produced specifically for
legal purposes, caveats, disclaimers, and dissenting views can
sometimes disappear."' Intelligence analysis is hardly ever
certain, and aside from obvious examples such as photographs or
"' See, e.g., supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
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voice intercepts, it is usually not based upon the kind of scientific
evidence courts are used to, such as fingerprints or DNA.
Accordingly, assessments should be forthright about information
sources as well as caveats. When analyses such as the Mobbs
Declarations addressing Hamdi and Padilla evince virtually no
qualifiers whatsoever,"1 6 courts should wonder how and why the
conclusions are concurrently nonspecific and unequivocal.
More broadly, assessments that address sensitive or
controversial topics may lose some objectivity as a result of
The
individual or institutional pressures and incentives.
command-and-control structure of a Congolese insurgent faction
is not likely to be controversial; whether a Guantanamo Bay
detainee was a member of the Taliban or just an innocent Afghan
farmer who was in the wrong place at the wrong time,
conversely, is a question that engenders intense political and
legal passions."' Individual or structural pressures, or even
mere attention, can result in factors other than just
the available facts influencing assessments. The context of
bureaucratic and government incentives should always be
considered.
Finally, prospective analysis is often more speculative and
Predictive
less informed than retrospective assessments.
intelligence-such as estimations of likely recidivism when
examining the detention of accused enemy combatants-is
naturally conjectural. 7 8 By contrast, demonstration of acts or
associations already undertaken is, or at least can be, founded
upon concrete evidence. With all intelligence, and especially with
prospective analysis, assessments should include explanations of
the level of confidence of conclusions as well as
of the component estimative parts that led to the judgments.
Where such explanations of confidence level are lacking, courts
should proceed with caution; conversely, intelligence that is
straightforward, well-sourced, and candid about strengths and
weaknesses should be afforded greater credence.

See supra notes 158, 160 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 157-164 and accompanying text.
1'

17

1322

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1275

3.

Examine Source Material
Courts cannot assess the validity of protected information
without having a sense of its origins. As noted above, source
material is a critical indicator of validity, and courts should not
hesitate to review it when it is available. The government may
want to avoid revealing certain "sources" and "methods"
information, but to the extent that the inferences and conclusions
from those sources are being provided, the foundational
intelligence should be made available. Even if unclassified
or lesser-classified summaries are provided, details about
informational origin are an essential element of determining
reliability and authenticity.
A common problem with intelligence is "circular reporting"
or "circular sourcing," where information appears to come from
multiple independent sources but in fact derives from a single
source."' This kind of false confirmation can result from careless
analysis or, in some circumstances, may be intentionally caused
by the original source of the information. If the meaning or
derivation of source material is unclear, courts should require
further explanation or clarification, and when appraising
sources, courts should not mistake ambiguity or impenetrability
for sophistication. Legitimacy and veracity of some sources will
be intuitively obvious; pictures or recordings, for example, while
not inevitably representative of what they purport to
demonstrate, are more likely reliable than, say, a description
from an unnamed individual who may have any number of
motivations to lie or mislead. Other sources will be harder to
evaluate, to be sure, but courts can only make appropriate
judgments if they venture beyond the conclusions into the
underlying analysis and source material. How courts can and do
achieve this, and under what circumstances they have tried-and
succeeded and failed-is discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.

19 See, e.g., Bob Drogin & Tom Hamburger, The Nation; Niger Uranium Rumors
Wouldn't Die, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al (addressing the persistent
intelligence reporting-ultimately proved false-that Saddam Hussein sought
uranium from Niger). According to a United States intelligence official, "This became
a classic case of circular reporting . . .. It seemed like we were hearing it from lots of
places. People didn't realize it was the same bad information coming in different
doors." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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If information about underlying intelligence is unavailable or
not provided, courts should recognize that may be because the
analysis is unreliable, misleading, or not thoroughly sourced.
Protected information lacking context or explanation should be
treated the same way any other similarly-presented evidence
would be: skeptically. Rather than being instinctively credulous
or impressed when faced with a document stamped
CLASSIFIED, courts must be mindful of the importance of
examining sources, considering incentives, and paying close
Courts should also have the
attention to language cues.
confidence-as they already have the authority-to ask for more
information or explanation regarding protected information
when it is unclear or incomplete. Similarly, government claims
that secret material is unreviewable ought to be accompanied
by thorough and persuasive explanations, or else rejected.
Underlying sources and analyses should be examined, and when
assessments and conclusions are unsourced or thinly-sourced,
they should not be considered reliable without excellent
justification for such deficiencies.
B.

Selected Instances of Court Engagement with Protected
Materials

Courts have confronted and managed protected materials in
a wide variety of circumstances and contexts. Many judges
decline to even view the underlying information at issue,
especially in SSP cases, while others, particularly in criminal
cases where CIPA applies, deal with intelligence as a matter of
course. In recent years, non-traditional proceedings, specifically
those dealing with detainee rights and other "War on Terror"
issues, have created new and unusual contexts for the use of this
kind of information. Few courts, however, address in depth how
they view or analyze protected material. It is therefore useful
to briefly examine instances in which courts discuss their
engagement with classified evidence, whether effectively or
ineffectively, and to examine types of approaches.
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Parhatv. Gates

Perhaps the best example of a court engaging with
intelligence materials thoughtfully and comprehensively is
Parhat v. Gates."so Judge Merrick Garland's opinion for the
D.C. Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals evinces
precisely the kind of careful analysis-and healthy skepticismadvocated by this Article, and if the decision reads as critical of
the government, it is only because, in this particular instance,
the government used profoundly inadequate intelligence to
advance a deficient legal argument.
The court in Parhat
approached the protected information in just the right way,
insisting upon evaluating not just the conclusions of the multiple
intelligence documents submitted, but also the underlying
sources and methods, for reliability and breadth. The court
obviously took seriously the responsibility to evaluate
government claims, rather than accepting them at face value.
The court noted at the beginning of its opinion-in
explaining that it was reviewing the decision of a Guantanamo
Bay detainee's Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT")that a Tribunal's ruling "must be based on evidence that both the
Tribunal and the court can assess for reliability.""' The Circuit
Court took seriously this directive, analyzing the intelligence
with a level of detail and care that few courts attempt. Even
with the relaxed CSRT standards-including a rebuttable
presumption that government evidence is genuine and accurate,
allowance of hearsay evidence, etcetera-the court found the
proof insufficient for continued detention, focusing especially
on the deficiencies of intelligence materials that ostensibly
supported the CSRT finding that Parhat was an enemy
combatant. 182
That evidence, the court noted, came "from four U.S.
government intelligence documents, one from the Department of
State and three from components of the Department of
Defense."' 3 These reports were heavily classified, so their
contents, as well as the elements of the court's decision
specifically discussing them, are unavailable to the public. The
opinion, however, addresses the evidence more generally, and
1s0532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
18 Id.
at 836.
182 Id. at 846-50.
183

Id. at 844.
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it discusses a number of factors discussed in this Article.
Regarding ambiguous and hedged language, Judge Garland
wrote: "The documents repeatedly describe [the] activities and
relationships as having 'reportedly' occurred, as being 'said to' or
'reported to' have happened, and as things that 'may' be true or
are 'suspected of having taken place."18
As discussed previously, even equivocal language and
conclusions can be extremely useful, depending on context and
underlying support. Something can be "said to" have occurred by
a single, unreliable source, or by several individuals with a
proven track record of reliability and veracity. Due to the
constraints of custom and language, there may not be a way
to immediately identify the difference between those two
possibilities, or the virtually endless range of possibilities
between and beyond them, without looking at the underlying
bases for the judgments. Which is precisely what the Parhat
court did, finding that "in virtually every instance, the
documents do not say who 'reported' or 'said' or 'suspected' those
things. Nor do they provide any of the underlying reporting upon
which the documents' bottom-line assertions are founded, nor
any assessment of the reliability of that reporting.""'
The approach regarding protected information taken by the
court in Parhat-andmore generally advocated by this Articlediffers little from that used with any other kind of evidence. In
his discussion of the preponderance standard, Judge Garland
cited the Supreme Court opinion in Concrete Pipe & Products of
California, Inc., v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for

Southern California, which explained: "Before any such burden
can be satisfied ... the factfinder must evaluate the raw
evidence, finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently
probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition
with the requisite degree of certainty."1 86 In Parhat,not only was
there precious little concrete evidence to support sweeping

1" Id. at 846.
...Id. at 846-47.
186

Id. at 847 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension

Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)).
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accusations against the defendant, but the court was profoundly
unimpressed with the government's claims that the intelligence
was reliable:
First, the government suggests that several of the
assertions in the intelligence documents are reliable because
they are made in at least three different documents. We are not
persuaded. Lewis Carroll notwithstanding, the fact that the
government has "said it thrice" does not make an allegation
true. In fact, we have no basis for concluding that there are
independent sources for the documents' thrice-made assertions.
To the contrary,

. .

. many of those assertions are made in

identical language, suggesting that later documents may merely
be citing earlier ones, and hence that all may ultimately derive
from a single source.

...

Second, the government insists that the statements made in
the documents are reliable because the State and Defense
Departments would not have put them in intelligence
documents were that not the case. This comes perilously close
to suggesting that whatever the government says must be
treated as true ....
We ... reject the government's contention that it can prevail by
submitting documents that read as if they were indictments or
civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the elements
required to prove [the allegations]."'8
The court went on to note that it was not "suggest[ing] that
the government must always submit the underlying basis for its
factual assertions in order to make such an assessment [of
reliability] possible."" There are myriad ways the government
might demonstrate the veracity of intelligence materials-or that
analytical judgments can self-authenticate through explanations
of sourcing and analysis. The court made no specific demands
regarding demonstration of reliability, but rather "merely
reject[ed] the government's contention that it can prevail by
submitting documents that read as if they were indictments or
civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the elements
required [for proof] ."189

Id. at 848-50.
Id. at 849.
189 Id. at 850.
"I8
188
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The court in Parhat applied appropriate skepticism in its
evaluation of classified intelligence that was superficially
assertive but, upon closer examination, suffused with caveats.
When the court attempted to determine the reliability of the
statements by reviewing the underlying information, it found
that much of the raw intelligence was unavailable and/or
suggestive of circular reporting."so While this may seem like a
logical or unremarkable approach, many judges confronted with
disputed protected material decline even to review it, and it is
still more unusual for courts to explore the basis for intelligence
conclusions rather than accepting them at face value. The end
result of this kind of process is by no means biased toward
rejecting government evidence; indeed, were the conclusions of
the classified materials in Parhatbetter supported by underlying
sources, there is every reason to believe the government would
have won a resounding victory. In the next case illustration, for
example, a judge analyzing evidence against multiple defendants
found that the information supported the accusations against one
but not the others. But judges and courts can only determine
reliability if they have all the information available, and if they
can appropriately decipher those materials in their analysis. In
Parhat,the court was unusually rigorous on both counts.
2.

Boumediene v. Bush

Another example of a court frankly discussing the issues
associated with classified evidence comes from a surprising
source: Judge Richard Leon, of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. Judge Leon was appointed by
President George W. Bush, was Deputy Chief counsel for
Republicans on the Iran-Contra Committee in 1987, and worked
in the Department of Justice under Presidents Reagan and
George H.W. Bush.19 ' Additionally, in Judge Leon's initial
rulings regarding indefinite detention of terrorist suspects, he
granted the government's motion to dismiss detainees' petitions
for writs of habeas corpus-a decision made without viewing any

190 Id.

11' See District Judge Richard J. Leon, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, http://
www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/leon (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
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underlying substantive evidence.19 2 He is, in short, an unlikely
person to convey a decisive indictment of protected material
offered by the government against accused terrorists.
And yet that is precisely what Judge Leon delivered in his
opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, a case involving the habeas
corpus petition of Lakhdar Boumediene and five other
Guantanamo Bay detainees accused of being terrorist supporters
of al Qaeda."' On remand from the Supreme Court, which had
found that these detainees had the right to appeal their
detention status, Judge Leon presided over the required habeas
hearing.1 94 Pursuant to that inquiry, the Government submitted
"approximately 650 pages of exhibits and a 53-page narrative,
setting forth the Government's alleged legal and factual basis
for holding the six petitioners as 'enemy combatants,' and the
court heard several days of testimony and argument.s95 The
government needed only to prove the lawfulness of detention by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 6
Despite this apparently voluminous evidence against the
detainees, Judge Leon found that the defendants' alleged plan to
travel to Afghanistan to fight American and allied forces was
based "exclusively on the information contained in a classified
document from an unnamed source. This source is the only
evidence in the record directly supporting each detainee's alleged
The
knowledge of, or commitment to, this supposed plan."9
opinion expressed skepticism about this source, saying that the
government had "not provided the Court with enough
information to adequately evaluate the credibility and reliability
of this source's information" and that "the Court was not
provided with adequate corroborating evidence that these
petitioners knew of and were committed to such a plan."9 s Judge
Leon acknowledged that because the evidence was classified, he
could not be more specific about its deficiencies, but he noted that
the exclusive basis upon which the detainees had been held for
192 See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated,
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
19
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193-94 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd,
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
194 Id. at 191-92.
19 Id. at 193, 195.

" Id. at 196.
19

Id. at 197.

198 Id.
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seven years "rest[ed] on so thin a reed" as to be insufficient for
even a preponderance standard.199
Additionally, Judge Leon came to a different conclusion
when analyzing the evidence surrounding one of the six
petitioners involved in the case. The government had provided
additional evidence regarding Belkacem Bensayah, including "a
series of other intelligence reports based on a variety of sources
and evidence." 20 0 Given this apparently substantial and reliable
evidence against Bensayah, beyond the insufficient proof offered
against the other detainees, he found that Bensayah was
appropriately categorized as an enemy combatant. 20 1 Rigorous
examination of protected materials will of course lead to
particularized and specific differentiation.
This kind of thorough, considered analysis of a vast amount
of classified evidence was crucial to a fair and reasoned
Judge Leon examined the
determination in Boumediene.
that it was impossible to
he
noted
and
information available,
properly evaluate critical intelligence claims for credibility
or corroboration because the government could not-or would
not-provide information enabling him to do so. Had Judge
Leon not rigorously examined the materials provided, or been
overwhelmed or persuaded by the sheer volume of the
government's presentation of secret information, he might have
accepted even the "thin reed" 20 2 as adequate and perpetuated
unreasonable and unlawful incarcerations; conversely, had he
been dismissive of all the intelligence, or doubtful of all
evidentiary submissions due to government overreach in some
aspects of the case, he might have ordered the release of an
individual for whom there was sufficient evidence to continue
detention. Instead, Judge Leon seems to have taken the kind of
methodical and comprehensive approach required for just
results.

19 Id.
200
201

Id. at 198.

202

Id. at 197.

Id.
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Mohammed v. Jeppesen and Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation,Inc. v. Bush
Unlike the issues presented in the flurry of "nontraditional,"
post-9/11 cases, most of which involved questions of
constitutional and international law apart from traditional civil
or criminal proceedings, matters involving the SSP have
confronted courts for more than fifty years. As discussed in Part
I above, the SSP has expanded in recent years, both in frequency
of use and breadth of applicability. While the privilege was once
used rarely and only as a challenge to specific pieces of evidence,
generally during discovery, recent government invocation of the
SSP has prevented lawsuits from even reaching the discovery
phase.20 3 The privilege has become a means to have entire cases
dismissed, sometimes even without a thorough examination of
whether plaintiffs have enough evidence to move forward
without-or with an unclassified summary of-the disputed
protected information.20 4
The Jeppesen and Al-Haramain cases 20 5 are addressed jointly
here because they contain similar issues and, together, represent
how careful, conscientious, and healthily skeptical treatment of
government state secret claims can result in different results
similarly
appropriate-judicial
despite
similar-and
management.2 06 They also demonstrate the typical perspectives
and rulings on these issues, evidenced by district court decisions,
followed by unusual, conscientious, and laudable treatments on
appeal.
In Jeppesen, five individuals alleged that they were victims
of "extraordinary rendition," a practice of apprehension and
detention of foreign nationals suspected of involvement in
Under this program, suspects were
terrorist activities.20 7
allegedly arrested and secretly transported to prisons operated
abroad by the CIA or by foreign countries, some of which were
3.

See supra notes 25, 37-38 and accompanying text.
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
205 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd
en
banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
206 Note: This analysis is of the April 2009 opinion (unanimous panel decision),
not the 6-5 en banc reversal of September 2010, which affirmed the district court
ruling.
207 Jeppesen, 579 F.3d at 949-51.
20

204 See
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known to torture detainees. 20 8 These individuals allegedly
included Binyam Mohamed, who filed suit against Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing Company, alleging that
Jeppesen knowingly assisted these renditions by providing
logistical support to flights used by the CIA. 2 09 The United
States invoked the state secrets privilege, claiming that litigation
would undermine national security even though many of the
details alleged-and claimed by the government to be classifiedhad already been made public by the media. 2 10 This SSP claim
was initially invoked by the Bush Administration, but was also
continued, to the surprise of many observers-including the
presiding judges-by the Obama administration.2 n
In Al-Haramain, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation,
which says that it is a charity but is alleged by the United States
to have links to terrorist organizations, claimed that the federal
government spied on the group and its officials using illegal
electronic surveillance.2 12 In a legal proceeding separate from the
surveillance lawsuit, a classified document indicating that the
group was indeed the subject of electronic surveillance was
mistakenly disclosed to Al-Haramain's attorneys; the government
subsequently reclaimed the document and declared its contents
an inadmissible state secret.2 13
In both cases, the district courts granted the government's
motions to apply the SSP. 214 In Al-Haramain, that ruling was
limited; Judge King agreed to apply the privilege to the classified
document in question, but refused to dismiss the case in its
Id.
Id. at 949, 951.
210 Id. at 951.
211 See Schwartz, supra note 99 ("The Bush administration argued that
the
[Jeppesen] case should be dismissed because even discussing it in court could
threaten national security and relations with other nations. During the campaign,
Mr. Obama harshly criticized the Bush administration's treatment of
detainees,... [blut a government lawyer, Douglas N. Letter, made the same statesecrets argument on Monday, startling several judges on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 'Is there anything material that has happened' that
might have caused the Justice Department to shift its views, asked Judge Mary M.
Schroeder,... coyly referring to the recent election. 'No, your honor,' Mr. Letter
replied. Judge Schroeder asked, 'The change in administration has no bearing?' Once
more, he said, 'No, Your Honor.' ").
212 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir.
2007).
213 Id.
214 Jeppesen, 579 F.3d at 951; Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1195-96.
208
20
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entirety, advancing the novel proposal that plaintiffs' attorneys
file affidavits describing their memories of the document to prove
that the Foundation was surveilled.21 5 The circuit court, while
sympathetic to the "commendable effort to thread the needle[,] "216
disallowed that approach, ruling that it "countenance[d] a back
door around the privilege," which "[o]nce properly invoked and
it
judicially blessed, . . . is not a half-way proposition."2 1 7
otherwise agreed with the district court, finding that while the
very subject matter of the litigation was not a state secret-the
surveillance program having been widely reported in the media
and then acknowledged by the Bush administration-the
classified document in question was protected by SSP and
therefore inadmissible.2 18
Crucially, the court explained its process and reasoning in
coming to this conclusion regarding the document, which it
reviewed in camera:
We take very seriously our obligation to review the documents
with a very careful, indeed a skeptical, eye, and not to accept at
face value the government's claim or justification of privilege.
Simply saying 'military secret,' 'national security' or 'terrorist
threat' or invoking an ethereal fear that disclosure will threaten
our nation is insufficient to support the privilege. Sufficient
detail must be-and has been-provided for us to make a
meaningful examination.

...

We have spent considerable time examining the government's
declarations (both publicly filed and those filed under seal). We
are satisfied that the basis for the privilege is exceptionally well
documented.219
It is impossible to know, of course, precisely what proof the
government offered to the court, and in particular whether there
were deficiencies of the type that, for example, the court in

215

Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1229 (D. Or.

2006).
F.3d at 1204.
Id. at 1193.
218 Id. at 1204-05 ("The Sealed Document, its contents, and any individuals'
memories of its contents, even well-reasoned speculation as to its contents, are
completely barred from further disclosure in this litigation by the common law state
secrets privilege.").
219 Id. at 1203.
216Al-Haramain,507
217
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Parhat recognized. 22 0 But as a matter of process, courts should
take a careful, skeptical and thorough approach when evaluating
classified material, and should include some explanation and
acknowledgment of these elements in their opinions.2 2 1
The district court in Jeppesen upheld an even more sweeping
SSP claim, ruling that "the issues involved ... are non-justiciable
because the very subject matter of the case is a state secret."2 22
The opinion provided only a brief explanation for finding that the
plaintiffs were barred from having their day in court against
government contractors that allegedly assisted in their torture:
"The Court's review of [CIA Director] General Hayden's public
and classified declarations confirm that proceeding with this case
would jeopardize national security and foreign relations and that
no protective procedure can salvage this case."223
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals declined to delve into the details of the substantive
claims, instead finding that under state secrets precedent, the
government could not prevent a lawsuit simply because it made
allegations regarding a secretive program. The court stated:
At base, the government argues here that state secrets form
the subject matter of a lawsuit, and therefore require dismissal,
any time a complaint contains allegations, the truth or falsity of
which has been classified as secret by a government official....
This sweeping characterization of the "very subject matter" bar
has no logical limit ....

According to the government's theory,

the Judiciary should effectively cordon off all secret government
actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its
partners from the demands and limits of the law. We reject this
interpretation ... .224

Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Although the SSP claim was upheld in Al-Haramain, on remand a district
court later ruled that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1810which allows damage lawsuits by targets of illegal government surveillancedisplaces the state secrets privilege. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama
(In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.), 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1184
(N.D. Cal. 2010). In 2010, after protracted battles between the court and the
government regarding the classified document in dispute, the government was found
to have broken the law in its monitoring of the Foundation. Id.
222 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-35 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), rev'd, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, .131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
223 Id.
at 1135.
224 Jeppesen, 579 F.3d at 955.
220

221
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Instead, the court noted, the state secrets privilege should,
except in extraordinary circumstances, 225 be used regarding
specific pieces of evidence "on an item-by-item basis, rather than
foreclosing litigation altogether at the outset. ... "226 The court
went on to refuse the government's request that the case be
dismissed at its outset even if the subject matter was not found
to be a state secret. Because the state secrets privilege, like any
other privilege, "'extends only to [evidence] and not to facts,' it
cannot be invoked to prevent a litigant from persuading a jury of
the truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to non-privileged
evidence, regardless whether privileged evidence might also be
probative of the truth or falsity of the allegation."22 7
Court rejections of SSP invocations are so extraordinarily
rare that this ruling, while perhaps superficially unremarkable,
is an atypical and important example for how courts should view
far-reaching government claims of secrecy in the legal process. It
was also, however, short-lived; seventeen months later, following
the grant of an appeal for en banc rehearing, a closely divided
panel voted 6-5 to overturn the panel decision, affirming the
district court's dismissal of the entire claim.22 8
4.

United States. v. Reynolds and El-Masri v. United States

The instances in which courts have granted the
government's request to apply the SSP while declining to look at
the substantive materials covered by invocations-or viewing the
intelligence in a cursory and unquestioning fashion-are so
numerous that it might seem superfluous to discuss specific
examples. However, for the sake of comparison with the abovementioned cases, and so readers do not mistake a handful of
sagacious but anomalous decisions for predominance or a trend,
it is useful to examine two cases as bookend examples of wellintentioned but inadequate approaches.

225 Id. at 956 (such as if a lawsuit is predicated on the existence of a secret
agreement between a plaintiff and the government).
226 Id. at 955.
227 Id. at 957-58 (alteration in original) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States,
449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981)).
228 See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying
text.
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The foundational case for the SSP doctrine, as discussed
briefly in Part I.A.2, is United States. v. Reynolds.22 9 In Reynolds,
the Supreme Court established the doctrine for the SSP, and in
doing so it set an ignoble precedent for the treatment of classified
intelligence. Reynolds is a kind of original sin with regard to
protected material; not only is it a vague and equivocal opinion, it
established-in what would be an ironic twist if it were not so
predictable given the government's incentives to conceal
mistakes and negligence-an exceedingly credulous example for
dealing with claims of secrecy in a case where the underlying
information actually had no apparent relation whatsoever to
secrets implicating national security.
In 1948, three Air Force contractors were killed when a B-29
Superfortress crashed in Georgia.2 30 Their widows filed suit
against the government for negligence, and they requested the
production of the government's accident reports.2 3 1 The Air Force
refused to produce the documents, claiming that to reveal them
would threaten national security due to the electronics secrets
involved.23 2 The trial court rejected the claim of privilege,
holding in favor of the plaintiffs and ordering the government to
produce the documents so the court could determine whether
they contained legitimately secret information. 23 3 The Third
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed, both
regarding the question of document production and the
disposition due to the government's refusal to produce the
requested materials.23 4
The Supreme Court, as discussed above, determined that it
did not need to review the documents to establish the legitimacy
of the privilege claim, finding that in "a time of vigorous
preparation for national defense" there was "a reasonable danger
that the accident investigation report would contain references to
the secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of
the mission."2 35 Reinforcing this weak standard-even while
229 Supra notes

19-20 and accompanying text.
Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950), affd sub nom.,
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd sub nom., United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
230

23

Id.

232

Id. at 472.
Id.
Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 998.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).

233
234
23
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granting that in many circumstances it would be not only
allowable but important for courts to review the disputed
information-the decision went on to state that "under
circumstances indicating a reasonable possibility that military
secrets were involved, there was certainly a sufficient showing of
.
privilege to cut off further demand for the document.. ."236
unhelpful
and
dubious
largely
These comments, providing
guidance even at the time, border on farcical given the reality of
the documents' contents.
In February 2000, Judy Palya Loether, the daughter of Al
Palya, one of the contractors killed in the B-29 crash, was
searching online for information about the accident.23 She had
done so occasionally for years out of curiosity about a father she
had never known, a man who died when she was just seven
weeks old.23 8 At the time, she did not even know there had been
an accident report, had no knowledge about the Reynolds case,
and had no idea that the government had refused to produce
relevant documents nearly fifty years before.3 On that day, she
stumbled upon a website that advertised declassified military
accident reports from 1918 to 1955. Curious about her father's
work, with no thought to the cause of the crash, Ms. Loether
bought a copy of the report.240
To her surprise, and disappointment, there was nothing that
seemed secret or even interesting, no information about her
father or his work. What the report did detail, however, was an
extraordinary amount of negligence and mistakes that led to the
fatal crash. Maintenance problems. Fire hazards. The wrong
engine shutting down in the midst of an emergency. The report
detailed exactly the kind of negligence alleged decades before and
The
made no mention of secret electronic equipment.
foundational case of the SSP was, by all appearances, based on
government dissembling to the Supreme Court. The descendents
of the contractors later brought an action against the United
States for misrepresenting the classified material. The Third
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals found that the
23

Id.

at 10-11.

Barry Siegel, The Secret of the B-29; A Daughter Discovers what Really
Happened, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at Al.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. The account in the following paragraph is likewise from Barry Siegel's
article.
237
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actions of the Air Force officials did not meet the stringent test of
fraud upon the court;241 Senator Specter of Pennsylvania called
this decision "a little mystifying."24 2
Whether or not the Third Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals was correct in finding that "there is an
obviously reasonable truthful interpretation of the statements
made by the Air Force,"24 3 a conclusion the court made based on
a much broader reading of the statement than the Supreme
Court appears to have made in the original case, it seems
extraordinarily likely that the analysis would have been different
had the Supreme Court looked at the documents at issue in 1953.
It is also obvious that the government claim that the airplane
involved had been carrying "confidential equipment" and that
"any disclosure of its mission . . . operation or performance"

would for that reason be against public interest 244 implied that
the report itself involved information about the secret electronic
equipment.
It is undoubtedly true that the legal system sometimes
makes mistakes, particularly when not all the relevant
information is accessible. After cases are decided, facts can
reveal a wrong decision, and we accept this possibility as part of
a judicial system that values and respects finality except in the
most unusual or unjust scenarios. In instances like Reynolds,
however, to get it right, judges merely have to look at
information that is readily available. Courts should not allow
themselves to be bullied or condescended to; they are permittedand in some cases required-to consider protected information,
and they are qualified to do so, whether based on experience and
judgment or with the assistance of others.
More than fifty years after Reynolds, the Supreme Court
similarly declined to view the intelligence upon which an SSP
claim was based, despite an offer from the Solicitor General to
show the justices, "under appropriate security measures," the
classified declaration used in the lower courts to support the

Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2005).
Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Security While
Preserving Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
243 Herring, 424 F.3d at 392.
24 Brief for the United States at 43, United States. v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1
(1953) (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378.
241
242
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privilege claim.2 45 In El-Masri,2 46 the Court denied certiorari of
the circuit court decision without comment and without
reviewing the materials at issue.2 47 In contrast to the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in Jeppesen, the Eastern District of Virginia
and the Fourth Circuit dismissed the El-Masri case before
discovery 248 ; each court held that a plaintiff who alleged
systematic torture and abuse at the hands of the government
could not sue the United States because the very subject of his
suit was a state secret.24' El-Masri claimed that he was subject
to the widely-reported "extraordinary rendition" program, and
although his story was well known, the district court held-and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed-that allowing his lawsuit to proceed
would threaten United States national security.2 50
It is impossible to know how comprehensive or persuasive
the government's explanation was of why "damage to the
national security could result if the defendants . . . were required

to admit or deny El-Masri's allegations."25 1 The district court
explained that the ex parte classified declaration by the Director
of Central Intelligence was "a detailed explanation of the facts
and reasons underlying the assertion of the privilege."2 52 This
author wonders whether, as the El-Masri court wrote, "any
admission or denial of these allegations by defendants in this
case would reveal the means and methods employed pursuant to
this clandestine program and such a revelation would present a
grave risk of injury to national security [,] "253 but the court
insisted that its conclusion "finds firm support in the details
disclosed in the DCI's classified ex parte declaration." 25 4 In
addition to the broad understanding of what would threaten

2" Linda Greenhouse, Justices Turn Aside Case of Man Accusing C.LA.
Torture, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2007, at A20.
246 552 U.S. 947 (2007).
24' Greenhouse, supra note 245.
245 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007); E1-Masri
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006).
249 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d at 311; El-Masri v. Tenet, 437
Supp. 2d at 539.
250 See EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d at 312; EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437
Supp. 2d at 537.
251 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp.
2d at 537.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.

of

v.
F.
F.
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national security and the apparent lack of interest in the
underlying source material, the use of SSP essentially as a
motion to dismiss is deeply troubling.
The Ninth Circuit panel decision addressed this point in
Jeppesen, stating that no case law indicated that the subject
matter of a lawsuit can be a state secret, outside the limited
context of secret contracts, as in Totten v. United States.' That
court further explained: "The Supreme Court's 'very subject
matter' language appeared in a footnote in Reynolds, where the
Court simply characterized [the subject of Totten as a state
secret]. That brief passage did not signal a deliberate expansion
of Totten's uncompromising dismissal rule beyond secret
agreements with the government...."

By contrast, the

Fourth Circuit in El-Masri concluded, without any apparent
proof, that the plaintiff would need to access and use extensive
amounts of protected material to advance his case.257 This kind
of speculative and conclusory judgment takes the place of
precisely what the SSP process should do-apply specific rulings
Instead, the El-Masri court
to specific pieces of evidence.
assumed that the evidence needed to establish a prima facie case
could only come from protected materials, a conclusion made
without examination of that information on an individualized
basis.25 8
Engaging in still more conjecture, the El-Masri decision went
on to claim, again without any apparent examination of the
evidence ostensibly at issue, that even if El-Masri could establish
a prima facie case without state secrets, "the defendants could
not properly defend themselves without using privileged
evidence." 25 9 Astonishingly, the court said that its hypothetical
rendering of the course of the case, were it to go forward,
"illustrate [s] that virtually any conceivable response to El255 See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 2009)
(discussing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), and how separate from a
privilege or rule of evidence, the case establishes the non-justiciability of suits
against the government based on covert espionage agreements even in the absence
of a formal claim of privilege), rev'd en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
26 Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953)).
257 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Even
marshalling the evidence necessary to make the requisite showings would implicate
privileged state secrets . . .

25 See id. at 311.
259

Id. at 309.
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Masri's allegations would disclose privileged information.""o It is
hard to imagine another context in which a court could get away
with presuming all possible courses of litigation and then
dismissing a case based on that speculation.
Additionally, there is no indication that the court examined
evidence beyond the DCI Declaration.
Indeed, the court
employed a kind of circular argument regarding viewing
underlying materials-it twice quoted a passage from Reynolds
" '[w] hen . .. the

that

occasion

for

the

privilege

is

appropriate,... the court should not jeopardize the security
which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers."2 6 ' After information falls under the privilege, the
court said, it is protected from disclosure, even including, the
court argued, in camera examination.26 2 It is hard to imagine
how a court could determine, in most instances, whether the SSP
applies to evidence without having some sense of what the
information is, but courts from Reynolds to El-Masri have
seemingly been untroubled by this paradox, granting the
application of the privilege to unseen evidence based on
governmental pronouncements.63
Although this kind of analysis may be deeply flawed, it is by
no means uncommon. The Fourth Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals in El-Masri cites a number of decisions in which
suits were dismissed at the pleadings stage based on SSP
invocations,2 64 and this is consistent with the broad deference and
acquiescence practiced by courts in matters of national security.
However, as this Article demonstrates, there are better ways to
handle these kinds of cases and materials.
CONCLUSION
Protected information should be treated, to whatever extent
possible under the law, like any other kind of evidence: evaluated
for reliability, not presumed accurate on its face. This Article
has discussed the current legal and conceptual frameworks
260

Id. at 310.

261 Id.

at 306 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (second
and third alterations in original)).
262

See id.

263
264

See id. at 310-11.
See id.
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regarding judicial treatment of this kind of information, outlined
the structure and roles of the producers of classified materials,
and raised questions about how courts should view and analyze
material that may be privileged or protected. In answering those
questions, this Article has discussed the analytical process,
examined some of the various incentives and influences involved
with classified information, and addressed how some courts have
engaged with these issues. Without court engagement with-and
skepticism of-information and materials that the government
would prefer to keep secret, incentives and results alike will
continue to perpetuate excessive judicial deference as well as
unjust results. Like all other evidence, information allegedly
having implications for national security involves a variety of
personal and institutional biases, incentives, and errors. When
there are no checks on-or even consideration of-such factors,
these possibilities and problems are exacerbated.
In order to effectively engage with these kinds of materials,
courts, as well as many attorneys, must have an understanding
of what they are looking at when they consider protected
information. Accordingly, this Article has attempted to provide a
brief overview of the process of intelligence analysis, production,
and dissemination. The language and form of classified material
is neither intuitive nor widely understood in the legal
community, and this Article provides an initial blueprint for
comprehending and engaging it. As briefly described, some
courts have been assertive and penetrating when confronted with
claims of privilege, while others have been timid or credulous,
sometimes only to discover later that they have been misled.
The principle that power corrupts is universally accepted;
the phrase itself is an often-used idiom. The idea that secrecy
corrupts, however, is not quite as prevalent-but it should be.
Judges should not be awed or intimidated by the CLASSIFIED
stamp, and excessive deference leads to increased opportunities
for government misbehavior generally and unjust judicial results
specifically. Courts should have the confidence and knowledge to
assertively grapple with these issues, and members of the legal
community should participate in a discussion about protected
materials themselves. While there is substantial scholarship
addressing what kind of protected information should be
admissible and what standards and processes should control
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those judgments, there is too little discussion of the protected
material itself-a type of evidence that is here to stay, and which
has huge implications across the jurisprudential spectrum.

